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FOREWORD
Since the early stages of World War II, militaries in general, and
the U.S. Army in particular, have studied the German way of war,
speciﬁcally as practiced in the 20th century. While acknowledging
that Germany—and before that nation came into existence, Prussia—
produced some excellent armies, major problems with the German
way of war must not be ignored.
Even the casual observers should have noted that, despite the
military prowess of Germany, it lost both of the major wars of the
20th century. This Letort Paper, authored by Dr. Samuel J. Newland,
explores the reasons why a nation with such a strong military
reputation was unable to win its wars and achieve its goals. He
emphasizes that military power, tactical and operational brilliance,
and victories in the ﬁeld can easily be squandered if a nation has
failed to set achievable goals and develop strategies to reach them.
This failure, which led to Germany’s defeat in these wars, should not
be lost on modern nations as they proceed into the 21st century.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Since the early 1940s, the students of military operations in general,
and from the United States in particular, have studied German military
operations. While some of these studies have dealt with the wars of
the imperial era, particularly the Wars of German Uniﬁcation (186471), much more study has centered on the wars waged by the Third
Reich from 1939-45. From these studies, lessons have been extracted,
and military doctrine has been inﬂuenced. Regrettably, however, as
the German way of war has been studied, too often those studies have
focused on the tactical or the operational levels of war. The exploits, the
victories of German operational leaders such as Erwin Rommel, Heinz
Guderian, and Eric von Manstein have been traditional favorites. And
while the Germans have clearly inﬂuenced warfare on this level, even
the casual observer should have noticed that the Germans fought two
major wars in the 20th century and lost both of them, the second with
disastrous consequences. Thus the question emerges, What was wrong
with the oft-studied German way of war?
A signiﬁcant factor in their military failure can be laid at the top
with both their civilian and military leadership. For while the Germans
have excelled tactically and operationally, they have exhibited
signiﬁcant weaknesses in developing achievable goals for their nation
and appropriate strategies for achieving these goals. In the time that
stretched from the beginning of the 1860s until the end of World War II,
Germany only had one brief period when it could bask in the glory of the
European leadership it so desired. That brief period was from 1871 until
1889 when Otto von Bismarck was Chancellor. Following Bismarck (and
Chief of the German General Staff Helmuth von Moltke), the German
record of setting achievable goals and developing and following logical
strategies is poor.
This Letort Paper is designed to explore these issues and provide
an overview of the development of Germany as a nation and German
military thought in the 19th century. It examines the origins of modern
German military thinking and the concepts promoted by some of
Germany’s key military and political leadership.
It emphasizes that, if a nation is unwilling or incapable of designing
logical strategies, tactical and operational victories in the ﬁeld will come
to naught.

vii

INTRODUCTION
From Thomas Carlyle to Martin Van Creveld, Prussian-German Prowess
has attracted more than its share of homage from soldiers and military
historians alike.
Holger H. Herwig1

This Letort Paper is written to examine the claimed German
“genius for war,” whether it exists and, if so, at what levels. This
question has long intrigued the author who is, by his academic
education and major interest, a German historian. Beyond the writer’s
own intellectual curiosity, the question has signiﬁcance for the U.S.
Army. Consider, for example, that since the end of World War II, the
U.S. Army has expended considerable energy studying the German
way of war. These studies include numerous publications produced
at Fort Leavenworth, as well as such impressive projects as the
multiple interviews and monographs completed by German ofﬁcers
from 1945 to 1954, working in cooperation with Headquarters, U.S.
Army Europe. These Army studies cover a profusion of topics from
strategies and campaigns in all theaters where the German Army
fought during World War II, as well as obscure topics such as the
utilization of canines by the German Army. They also cover the full
spectrum of warfare from theater level operations to anti-partisan
operations in the Balkans and Russia.
Despite the passage of some 60 years, German doctrinal concepts
such as Auftragstaktik and examples of battles and campaigns are still
studied at military educational institutions, and some are included in
U.S. Army doctrinal and instructional materials. The title of Colonel
T. N. Dupuy’s Book, A Genius For War . . ., seems to best sum up
the rationale for many military writers’ fascination with German
military practices.2
The fascination with German military prowess is not just a
“military thing,” a fascination by soldiers about other soldiers.
Indeed, serious historians, pseudo historians, and military buffs
have added, seemingly weekly, to the bulk of studies on the Army
ﬁelded by the Third Reich, causing the shelves of respectable military
libraries to creak from the sheer weight of these publications. The
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intrigue with the successes, leadership, and tactics of the German
Army also has been shared by the military establishments of other
nations, providing a student of German military history who wishes
to achieve proﬁciency in this ﬁeld of study with a daunting task.
In addition to the literature of the past 50 years, mainly focusing
on the military of the Third Reich, publications continue to emerge
on the German conduct of World War I, the Wars of Uniﬁcation,
and the wars fought by Frederick the Great and his immediate
successors. In particular, the history of the National Socialist State
and military doctrine, as well as its impact on political processes and
the leadership ability of key senior German ofﬁcers, continues to
intrigue students of the military art. This fascination shows no signs
of abating.
This paper is designed to explore German military practices and
their origins, and analyze the weaknesses in the 19th and early 20th
centuries of Prussian/German military thought. It emphasizes the
importance of national political and military leaders responsible for
higher levels of strategy, developing logical and sequential plans and
strategies. The ﬁrst 80 years of Germany’s existence indicate that, no
matter how proﬁcient a nation’s forces are on the battleﬁeld, if senior
political and military leaders have not done solid strategic planning
and have not developed achievable goals, the efforts of its military
forces will likely fail to produce the desired results.
Although many militaries have attempted to analyze the
competencies of the German military and even emulate some of
them, particularly on the operational level of war, too often the
failings of the German Army have not been studied properly. Most
military authors recognize any number of German capabilities on
the tactical and operational levels of war. Conversely, during the
20th century, the Germans have employed their forces in two major
World Wars and, despite their well-documented capabilities, have
been defeated, the second defeat being an overall calamitous event
for both the nation and its citizens. This causes students of military
history to ask, what was missing? How is it that a nation that has
dominated 20th century military thought has been unable to win its
wars? Or stated another way, if there is, in fact, a German genius for
war, why didn’t it produce victories rather than defeats in the wars
of the 20th century?
2

Many authors have studied this issue and attempted to identify
German shortcomings. Popular military historian Kenneth Macksey
concluded, though the Germans had “many admirable attributes,
talents and skills . . .,” that “Germany’s military methods so widely
respected were overshadowed by arrogance, excess, rigidity of
mind, bullying, and a blindness to the lessons of history.”3 Geoffrey
P. Magargee took a more balanced approach. Looking at the postwar German ofﬁcers’ assertion that Hitler had bullied them into
impossible military campaigns over their protests, Magargee stated:
Hidden below that superﬁcial argument, however, lies the Germans’
fundamental inability to make sound strategic judgments. This was a
problem with deep historical roots that, at the very least, stretched back
to Schlieffen and the senior ofﬁcers and ofﬁcials of his era. With almost
no exceptions, the Nazi-era military and government were devoid of
people who could correctly balance means and ends in order to come up
with a realistic strategic plan.4

Whether one totally agrees with his assessment, Megargee has
highlighted an important fact. Most of the ﬂaws in the German way
of war were evident before 1914, long before Hitler’s entry into
military affairs. The ﬂaws are thus ones of considerable duration and
have origins in the imperial period, rather than in the tragic National
Socialist era. Adding to the misunderstanding, many students have
been “taken in” by the memoirs, the interviews of senior German
ofﬁcers who, after World War II, claimed that the German Armed
Forces were robbed of many of their rightful victories by Hitler’s
interference in everything from strategic to tactical decisions. This
postwar revisionist line by key German generals would lead one
to believe that most of the ﬂaws in the German way of war were
tied to the National Socialist era and Hitler’s interference in military
matters.5 In fact, this writer’s research indicates that from 1870-1945,
four signiﬁcant problems existed within the German political/
military system. All deserve careful examination by serious students
of the military art.
First, from the mid 1860s, German military thinkers planned for
and relied on the concept of a short, speedy victory to achieve their
major goals. Planning for the short war acknowledged that Germany’s
warmaking capabilities would not likely support long wars of
3

attrition. And the concept of short, speedy decisive wars was based
largely on the experiences of 1864-71. Despite this recognition, twice
in the 20th century, Germany became involved in lengthy attritional
conﬂicts, both producing disastrous results for that nation.
A second problem deserves careful consideration. If a country’s
political and military leadership has not engaged in the necessary
strategic planning and established achievable objectives, no matter
how tactically or operationally proﬁcient that country’s military is,
successes on the battleﬁeld likely will be squandered. In short, military
victories are not enough and should not be viewed in isolation!
Obviously this problem is not exclusively a military issue since a
nation’s national security strategy normally should be developed
through the political system with military input. When this does not
occur, there is a serious disconnect. As succinctly described by Major
General, a.D., Christain O. E. Millotat, “Sheer military virtuosity
cannot compensate for the lack of political direction and National
Strategic objectives.”6
Third, and closely related to the previously-mentioned problem,
from the early 1890s until 1945, the military leadership consistently
intruded into the political side of the German national security
process. In part, this was due to the political leadership systematically
failing to develop a logical national security strategy. The military
leadership, particularly members of the famous (or in the opinion
of some, infamous) General Staff, intruded into the political realm
and, in essence, developed political as well as military priorities for
the German government. With their excessive involvement in this
important process, most of the solutions to Germany’s strategic
problems appeared resolvable by the use of the military, rather than
the political instrument of power.
Fourth, in a closely-related problem, the history of Germany from
the beginnings of the Second Reich (1871) through the Gotterdamerung
of the Third Reich7 shows an inability to recognize the value of using
multiple elements of power to achieve the nation’s goals. The writer
acknowledges that this descriptor, elements of power, is rather
recent terminology.8 Conversely, for generations many political and
military leaders have recognized intuitively that alternate methods
exist to achieve a nation’s political goals other than through waging
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war. As the ancient Chinese philosopher of war, Sun Tzu, stated,
“. . . Those skilled in war subdue the enemy’s army without battle.
They capture his cities without assaulting them and overthrow
his state without protracted operations.”9 In Germany, however,
even though the political element was often used—whether it was
chicanery on the eve of the Franco-Prussian War, negotiations on the
eve of World War I, or at Munich—a distinct tendency on the part
of the Germans was to gravitate, all too quickly, to blunt coercion
and to ignore all but the military element of power. In particular,
once conﬂicts started, the other elements of power were pushed
aside unceremoniously, and the Germans all too quickly pursued
their goals by using almost exclusively the military element of
power.10 War was viewed as the professional domain of the military,
and the military seemed to ignore the concept that a nation can, in
fact should, use concurrently or simultaneously several elements of
power to achieve its goals.11

5

CHAPTER 1
IMPERIAL ROOTS OF THE PROBLEMS
Two great soldiers, Helmuth von Moltke, the Elder, and Alfred von
Schlieffen, dominated Prusso-German military thinking from the mid19th century into the First World War and beyond. They taught and
practiced a mode of offensive warfare that adapted to the industrial age
Napoleon’s precept to seek prompt decision by battle, and in battle seek
to destroy the enemy.
Gunther E. Rothenberg12

The roots of German military greatness and the basis for its failures
lie deep in the 19th, rather than the 20th century. When the subject
of military failures is discussed, many Germans quickly gravitate
to the 20th century and a discussion of Hitler, whose progressive
interference in military matters becomes a classic example of how
the military was led to failure.13 Granted, from the earliest stages
of World War II, Hitler, with only the perspective of an enlisted
soldier, meddled in matters far above his capabilities. Conversely,
it is far too easy to blame an obviously evil dictator, a madman, for
Germany’s military failures rather than to analyze the root causes
of these failures. To blame one man, who’s “Thousand Year Reich”
only endured for 13 years, is far too simplistic. To understand the
origins of Germany’s military failures, one must ﬁrst understand at
least some rudiments of modern German history and its military and
political traditions.
This paper will refer to a “German way of war,” a term that
begs deﬁnition. The German way of war owes much to Napoleonic
warfare. Key elements in Napoleon’s practice of warfare were rapid
movement of his forces followed by the concentration of large bodies
of troops to seek a quick decision on the battleﬁeld, using tactical and
operational excellence to destroy the enemy force. In the last half
of the 19th century, German military leaders signiﬁcantly enhanced
Napoleonic offensive warfare. This enhancement consisted of using
railroads, telegraph, and repeating riﬂes—products of the new
industrial age—to make this type of warfare more rapid and lethal,
more decisive. This German way of war emerged in the 1860s during
7

the Wars of Uniﬁcation, and would continue to be used until the
waning stages of World War II.
Germany, among the major European powers, is a distinctly
modern creation. In the immediate post-medieval world when modern nation-states such as Britain and France emerged, Germany was
a series of fragmented states that seemed to have little opportunity to
unify as a nation-state under a single sovereign. Prior to 1871, some
300 states and ﬁefdoms existed, ruled by princes and, at best, minor
nobility, rather than a nation. Thus, while a people called Germans
have existed as an identiﬁable group for thousands of years, Germany,
the nation-state, has existed only for approximately a century-anda-half, making it a decided newcomer among the modern nationstates. Complicating this problem of multiple political entities, these
semi-feudal states also were economically autonomous, thereby
restricting, if not stiﬂing, economic intercourse.14 Since as a uniﬁed
nation-state it is, in many ways, still in its infancy, Germany’s recent
emergence on the world scene may explain some immaturity on the
world stage.
Complicating any effort to unify these states, at the beginning
of the 19th century two countries vied for the leadership of the
German people. The largest and most inﬂuential of Europe’s
German-speaking countries was the Hapsburg Empire, dominated
by Austria. This empire was ruled and administered by a veneer
of German ofﬁcials, but its population included a number of other
peoples who conceivably could not claim German origins. Czechs,
Slovaks, Slovenes, Poles, and Croats were included in this number,
to name only a few. Though it was an essentially polyglot state, the
Hapsburg Empire tended to dominate central European politics and,
to a large extent, the politics of the German states. In fact, from the
1815 Congress of Vienna, which forged the agreements ending the
Napoleonic Wars, until the Revolutions of 1848, its leader’s (Prince
Klemens von Metternich) brand of conservative politics dominated
Europe.
In the same period, to the north of the Hapsburg domain, the
second leading German state and the Hapsburg’s direct competitor
was the increasingly inﬂuential Prussia. This state was noted for its
military prowess rather than its cultural or commercial excellence.
The Prussian military had enhanced its reputation in the wars waged
8

by Frederick the Great and most recently in the Napoleonic Wars.
In fact, the German army, relying heavily on Prussian traditions,
retained this aura of military preeminence into the early 20th century.
The reader should note, however, that the Prussian army was in
many respects a dual-purpose entity. It had, in addition to its role
to defend the state, a signiﬁcant domestic role, i.e., preserving the
existing social order and the Hohenzollern-led state.15 Still, the roots
of a uniﬁed Germany’s military greatness, and at the same time its
failures, emerge in the post-Napoleonic period from Prussia rather
than from the Hapsburg Empire.
The movement for a uniﬁed Germany emerged in the late
Napoleonic era. In the wave of nationalistic feeling that swept
Europe in the wake of the Napoleonic wars, German nationalists
were signiﬁcant among the discontented European groups who
believed their aspirations had been ignored by the reactionary
settlements forged by the Congress of Vienna during 1814-15.16

9

While acknowledging their grievances, the many divisive issues
that separated the various principalities in the ﬁrst half of the 19th
century were so numerous that Germany seemed more of a dream
for dreamers, for visionaries, rather than a realistic possibility.
The creation of a modern, uniﬁed Germany and the philosophical
and experiential basis for the German way of war resulted from a
series of wars (1864-71) initiated by Prussia. Uniﬁcation was not
accomplished through a political or diplomatic process.17 As its
critics frequently point out, war forged the German state, rather than
a diplomatic or political process.18 The leading military ofﬁcer of the
Prussian army, Helmuth Von Moltke, justiﬁed this approach, widely
accepted in Prussia, stating:
A world historical transformation of German condition, such as that which
occurred in 1866, could not have come about by peaceful conventions
and decrees. Action was required—pressure on the inside, war on the
outside. One of the many German states had to become powerful enough
to carry along the rest of them.19

In short, rather than through diplomacy and politics, revolutions and
revolutionaries, German uniﬁcation would have to be forced, not
negotiated, and would be led by those more comfortable in uniform,
instead of those wearing coat and tails.
Ultimately Prussia, which was actually an on again-off again
supporter of German uniﬁcation, would take the lead in the effort to
unify the German states. Understanding Prussia, the core inﬂuence
on Germany’s political and military traditions from the mid-19th
century until 1945, and its role in the uniﬁcation of Germany is
essential to understanding the German way of war. Prussian military
thought, particularly in the wake of the Wars of Uniﬁcation (1864-70)
and its military campaigns during the same period, is the foundation
of both modern Germany and German military thought.20
The largest obstacle to unifying the German states was opposition
from neighboring European nations. For various reasons, strong
opposition to a uniﬁed Germany under Prussian leadership existed.
Prussia, after all, was synonymous with militarism as well as
autocratic rule. France, already a major power and for several centuries
a uniﬁed nation, opposed the formation of a strong German nationstate on its eastern ﬂank. France’s mid-19th century emperor, Louis
10

Napoleon, also had hopes of extending his nation’s borders to its
“natural” boundary, that is, the Rhine River. That obviously would
place a substantial number of Germans under French rule.21 Such a
move placed France in conﬂict with Prussia, which had expanded
westward toward that same river and, by this time, included a
province on the west bank, the Rhineland, which was coveted by
Louis Napoleon.
Even more serious for German nation-state proponents was the
opposition of the Hapsburg Empire. This empire and its dominant
German elite strongly opposed the emergence of a German nationstate; that is, one that was led by Prussia and excluded or minimized
the participation of the Hapsburgs. Even within German nationalistic
circles, there was a sharp divide about what should be included in
a uniﬁed Germany and who should lead it. This question resulted
in a serious rivalry between the two major German states, Prussia
and the Hapsburg Empire. With two of the three major continental
empires (the other being Russia) in opposition to the formation of a
united Germany, establishing a German nation-state, again, was no
small task.
An abortive attempt to unify Germany under a constitutional
government occurred during the Revolution of 1848, but reactionary
forces stopped this.22 The uniﬁcation of 1848 was led by liberal
political leaders. Since the liberal elements had limited experience
with the political process, had limited power, and faced enormous
political obstacles, their attempt to create a uniﬁed and more
democratic state ultimately failed. Given the signiﬁcant obstacles
preventing uniﬁcation, it was unlikely that it would have been
accomplished in a timely fashion using the traditional diplomatic
or political processes. In particular, the opposition of the major
continental powers, particularly France and the Hapsburg Empire,
made a diplomatic solution to this process somewhat dubious. As a
further complication, between 1848 and assumption of William I to
the throne in 1861, the popular enthusiasm for German uniﬁcation
cooled considerably.
The successful uniﬁcation, the extension of Prussian power,
and many of the elements of the German way of war have their
origins in the new Prussian leadership that came to power in 1858.
In that year, William I assumed the role of Regent for the Emperor
11

of Prussia.23 As regent, William ruled Prussia for the physically and
mentally ailing Frederick Wilhelm IV. Curiously, upon ascending
the throne, William’s primary interest was not focused on the issue
of uniﬁcation. Rather, he was most concerned in reforming and
expanding the Prussian Army, a factor that ultimately would be key
in the uniﬁcation process.24 His interest in the military was likely
due to the fact that, despite his political position as King of Prussia,
William was, by education and nature, a soldier, a position for which
he had been well-trained. Nonetheless, he should not be dismissed as
being indifferent or opposed to the uniﬁcation of the German states.
In reality, some of his early comments indicate he recognized that
uniﬁcation was important, and that Prussia would have a leading
role in it. As early as 1849, he wrote:
Whoever wishes to rule Germany must conquer it . . . That Prussia is
destined to lead Germany is shown by our whole history, but it is a
matter of when and how.25

12

The writer is quick to point out that prior to becoming Emperor,
William’s proposed “conquest” was through example and strong
leadership, not military campaigns. The above-cited quote is
signiﬁcant because it best shows his real interest, the promotion
of Prussian power. Prussian strength and leadership would then
bring about the uniﬁcation of Germany and at the same time would
enhance Prussia’s power. Whatever the motivation, Prussia had set
a clear azimuth; its Emperor intended to lead the Germans, or more
clearly dominate the German uniﬁcation process.
Upon becoming King, William was faced with a signiﬁcant
problem in achieving his primary goal for Prussia, i.e., military
reform. To accomplish his plan for expanding and strengthening
the Prussian army, he had to contend with dedicated and organized
opposition in parliament.26 When he submitted his plan to the
Prussian Chamber of Deputies, however, the deputies refused to
pass it without amendments that would have, in William’s opinion,
neutered his proposal. The King was so irritated and frustrated that
he even considered abdication. It was, however, in this atmosphere
that he selected a new Minister President for Prussia, Otto von
Bismarck. German uniﬁcation and a decidedly autocratic approach
to dealing with parliamentarians will be associated with his name
forever.

13

CHAPTER 2
LEADERS IN GERMAN UNIFICATION:
FOUNDERS OF TRADITIONS
His [Bismarck’s] motive for expansion was not geopolitical, but nationalistic
for the greater glory and power of Prussia and the Hohenzollern dynasty.
Otto Pﬂanze27
Moltke was both an exceptionally skilled organizer and a great ﬁeld
commander, employing rare powers of reasoning and administrative
competence to solve an apparently deadlocked strategic or operational
situation. This made him the most important military thinker between
the fall of Napoleon and the First World War.
Gunther E. Rothenberg28

The subject of German uniﬁcation is, for all time, strongly tied
to the name Otto von Bismarck. The name Bismarck should also
be associated with exceptionally brilliant and talented political
and strategic leadership. By background, Bismarck was a member
of an old, but not particularly distinguished Pomeranian Junker
family. When he came to power in September 1862, Bismarck, who
had achieved fame and notoriety as a reactionary delegate to the
Frankfurt Assembly, had been essentially “waiting in the wings”
for a number of months. The King had hesitated to appoint him
simply because he did not trust Bismarck. Despite his sovereign’s
initial reticence, Bismarck would prove to be unﬂinchingly loyal to
the Crown and to Prussia. Furthermore, the ﬁrst few years of the
Chancellor’s tenure would show that both Bismarck and the Emperor
were clearly in pursuit of similar “ends.” Both were committed to
retaining and extending the power of Prussia and preserving the
Hohenzollern dynasty. Thus, as accurately described by one of
Bismarck’s biographers, Otto Pﬂanze, “His (Bismarck’s) motive for
expansion was not geopolitical, but nationalistic for the greater glory
and power of Prussia and the Hohenzollern dynasty.”29 Bismarck
and the King, however, initially appeared to have different priorities
for achieving their mutually accepted ends.
15

As noted by numerous writers, as early as the 1850s Bismarck,
who was regarded as an ultra-conservative but not as a German
nationalist, came to appreciate the power of nationalism as a
signiﬁcant strategic weapon that could reinforce Prussian strength
and foreign policy.30 In fact, during and immediately after the
revolutions of 1848, Bismarck recognized and reported on the
potential of properly mobilized German public opinion as a weapon
that Prussia could use against liberal forces then in control of the
Frankfurt Assembly.31 Recognizing the potential power of German
nationalism, Bismarck was very willing to use nationalistic ardor
for his own purposes. Conversely, in the mid and latter 1850s, the
nationalism of 1848 had no immediate utility because nationalistic
ardor had cooled. If one were to read the writings of some of the
post-1870 German nationalistic historians, the reader would be led to
believe that after 1848, the German states were a seething nationalistic
caldron, waiting anxiously, pressing for yet another chance to form
a nation-state called Germany.32 In reality, however, after the failed
revolutions of 1848, nationalistic ardor and the move for uniﬁcation
had suffered a temporary hiatus. Nonetheless, it would be Bismarck
who would appreciate the power of German nationalism to overcome
the resistant loyalties of many Germans to their local principalities.33
In fact, it is not an exaggeration to state that Bismarck “hijacked” the
cause of nationalism from the German Progressives and utilized it to
strengthen the power of Prussia and the Hohenzollerns.34
In the Army War College’s terminology, as used in its strategy
analysis system, the overall goal, the “ends,” pursued by both
William and Bismarck were the maintenance of the Hohenzollern
monarchy and the leadership/dominance of the German states by
Prussia. A complementary element of this goal was that Prussia, not
the Hapsburgs, would lead the German states. Both Bismarck and
William witnessed and participated in the struggle between Austria
and Prussia over who would lead the states, particularly during the
calamitous events of 1848-50. Both recognized that uniﬁcation—
the development of nation-states—was a strong movement in
Europe, and both were determined that Prussia must take the lead
in German affairs, rather than Austria. In Bismarck’s opinion, the
maintenance or enhancement of Prussian and Hohenzollern power
and the preeminence of Prussia in German politics would have to
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be achieved through Prussia’s pressing its role as a leader of the
German states. Ultimately this would mean a confrontation with
another state, Austria, for it was loathe to surrender the leading role
it had enjoyed in the German states for centuries.
Having a solid agreement on the basic goals for Prussia, the
achievement of these goals would not be so simple. The obstacles
to uniﬁcation were daunting. The two major continental powers—
France and the Hapsburg Empire—had strong objections to a uniﬁed
Germany and/or a stronger Prussia. Nor was Russia keen about such
a prospect. It was unlikely that diplomacy alone would succeed in
unraveling the “Gordian Knot” of who would lead in the affairs of
central Europe or who would lead the on-again, off-again movement
to unify the German states under one sovereign. If Prussia was to
be the leader, a sound strategy to accomplish this, a committed
sovereign, and a wily, a shrewd political leader would be necessary.
This leadership would come from Bismarck.
When he became Minister President of Prussia, his policies offered
many positive and refreshing elements. Though he was regarded as a
conservative, even an ultra-conservative, he had political leadership
skills that are often overlooked. First, he never wavered from the
goals that both he and his sovereign had set. Throughout his tenure,
there was a remarkable continuity in his goals. At the same time, he
showed his willingness, his ability to compromise—that is, when it
served his purposes—and when compromise did not undercut his
goals. This is in contrast with the extreme ultra-conservatives, like
Edwin von Manteufel, who were more than willing to deal with
recalcitrant parliamentarians by having the army turn its guns on
them and drive them from their building. Bismarck avoided this type
of drastic response. Instead, he would use diplomacy, chicanery, or
coercion to stiﬂe the opposition, rather than an iron hand. During
his tenure in power, he had no qualms about blatantly co-opting
some of the opposition’s programs or ideas and promoting them as
his own.35 His ability to maneuver and his tactics under ﬁre from
the opposition resulted in numerous successes which prompted
repeated conversions from the opposition to Bismarck’s guidon.36
Above all, Bismarck’s hallmark and signiﬁcance for this
monograph centers on his ability to focus clearly on his goals and
his consistency in retaining them throughout his tenure in ofﬁce. His
17

aims, the extension of Prussian power
and the maintenance of the Hohenzollern
monarchy, were clearly shared with
those of his sovereign. He possessed an
additional talent; he was exceptionally
perceptive and intuitive as a politician
and diplomat. While he was a politician,
not a soldier, he did not shrink from
using the military element of power to
achieve his political goals.
For Bismarck, the ﬁrst test of his
leadership and his determination under
ﬁre would be in support of William’s
interest in reforming and expanding
Otto von Bismarck, initially Ministhe Prussian military. Rather than evict
ter President of Prussia, and
the Parliamentarians and lock the doors later Chancellor of Germany.
(Author’s Collection)
to their chambers, he reinterpreted
his powers and that of his sovereign and obtained the means—
the ﬁnances—to accomplish his sovereign’s goal. Simply, after
attempting to reach a peaceful accommodation with parliament over
the approval of the budget, Bismarck ignored the deadlock, the royal
bureaucracy continued to collect revenues without parliamentary
approval, and the government and the army continued to function
without interruption.
Though this was a successful tactic, he could not continue simply
to confront the opposition with such coups. Rather, it would be more
logical to employ tactics to neuter and, in some cases, convert members
of the liberal opposition within the Progressive Party. Thus, to erode
both Austria’s leadership role in German affairs and to begin the
process of robbing the liberal elements of their nationalistic banner,
in 1864 he involved Prussia and Austria in a war against Denmark
over the territories of Schleswig-Holstein. Though Austria and
Prussia were allies in this lopsided victory over the Danes, Prussian
prestige and leadership in the German states were elevated because
Prussia engineered the war. As an added beneﬁt, the joint AustroPrussian administration of the two duchies provided a potential
backdrop for conﬂict between the Austrians and the Prussians. That
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conﬂict, inherent in the dual administration of Schleswig-Holstein
and which supported Bismarck’s anti-Austrian posture, came to a
climax in 1866. In a calculated dispute over the administration of
the duchies, Bismarck, for the second time in the same decade, led
Prussia into a war.37 This war was designed to strip Austria of its
role as a leader in the politics of the German states and clearly put
Prussia into a leading role.
The war was a quick and decisive victory over Austria, a 7-weeks
war. Prussian troops went into motion on June 15, 1866, and the
decisive battle—Königgrätz—was fought on July 3. Although many
of the independent states of the German confederation supported
Austria, Prussia won through superior leadership on the ﬁeld and
with an army that clearly appreciated the advantages of mid-19th
century technology.38 At this juncture, however, a conﬂict emerges
between practitioners of the German way of war. Bismarck, mindful
of his goals, shared by the King, wanted to defeat Austria’s military
forces and, through the defeat, force Austria to bow out of the politics
of the North German states. He did not, however, wish to humiliate,
to defeat totally and occupy Austria. To do so could potentially
create a desire for vengeance by the Hapsburg Empire or cause a
power vacuum to develop in this region.39 Neither would it be in
Prussia’s interest. Prussia still had to live in central Europe after the
War and needed at least Austrian acquiescence in a likely future
war with France, a nation that stood squarely in the way of Prussian
ambitions. As Bismarck so succinctly wrote:
If we are not excessive in our demands and do not believe that we have
conquered the world, we will attain a peace that is worth our effort. But
we are just as quickly intoxicated as we are plunged into dejection, and
I have the thankless task of pouring water into the bubbling wine and
making it clear that we do not live alone in Europe, but with three other
powers that hate and envy us. 40

Thus, peace with some sort of honor was desired with and for
Austria.
This strategically and politically wise decision on Bismarck’s part
was not well-received by elements within the military establishment.
From the army’s perspective, even though Königgrätz was a
tremendous victory, a substantial part of the Austrian army remained
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intact. Austria was not defeated until its
army had been destroyed. Within the
military community, a clamor also was
heard to annex key areas and occupy
other parts of the Hapsburg lands, to
include Vienna. In this contest of wills,
Bismarck won perhaps in part because his
sovereign, William, had not been eager
to go to war in the ﬁrst place because he
disliked the idea of ﬁghting a kindred
nation. While Bismarck was setting the
pace for political and diplomatic action
in Prussia, the thoughts and traditions
Helmuth von Moltke
of the emerging Prussian military
leadership should also be explored.
Helmuth von Moltke, often referred to as Moltke the Elder,
dominated Prussian military practice in the 1860s. This ofﬁcer, who
effectively became ﬁeld commander of the Prussian army on June 2,
1866, seemed an unlikely candidate as military leader of the Prussian
army. Though born in Parchim, Mecklenburg, on October 26, 1800,
Moltke began his military career in Denmark, largely through the
insistence of his father. After a brief career in that country’s service, he
resigned from the Danish army in 1822 and joined the Prussian army,
certain that there were better chances for career advancement there.41
Moltke was an extremely intelligent ofﬁcer who had a serious and
studious disposition. With his scholarly interests, including a deep
appreciation for the classics and a talent for languages, he seemed
more likely to be an academic rather than a soldier. Nonetheless,
he pursued a career as a soldier, and his talents were evident when
high scores on entry exams resulted in his admittance to the General
War School in 1823. From then until the outbreak of the AustroPrussian War, he held numerous positions in the Prussian army.
His assignments, however, were as educator, historian, or staffer,
not as a commander of military units in the ﬁeld.42 Yet this ofﬁcer,
who began serving in an age when horse-drawn artillery and black
powder weapons were the standard, would, through his writings and
his command style, have a major impact on the Prussian/German
conduct of war from the 1860s until the end of the Third Reich.
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Moltke’s intellect, sharpened by years of study, permitted him
to understand clearly the challenges facing Prussia, particularly if it
chose to exercise the military element of power. He recognized that
Prussia, a nation with totally open borders and not truly a major
power, faced signiﬁcant challenges from larger and more powerful
nations. Prussia was limited in terms of resources. It did not have
signiﬁcant manpower reserves, like Russia, that would permit it to
lose or sacriﬁce signiﬁcant military formations while it built up its
forces or planned military responses.43 Thus, battles of attrition were
not a feasible tactic for Prussia. Nor could it trade ground for time,
as could the Russian Empire, because its land area was too small.
With limited resources, Prussia would have to engage its enemies
and wage its wars in a different, perhaps more efﬁcient, fashion.
Moltke held an approach to war that had some similarities to
Carl von Clausewitz, who Moltke openly acknowledged as one of
his philosophical mentors (even though they did not ever directly
work together).44 Thus, in true Clausewitzian style,he recognized the
changing, dynamic nature of war and, as a result, disliked doctrine
or establishing dogma on how wars should be waged, how battles
should be fought.45 In his thoughts he consistently emphasized
that set “cookie cutter” approaches to the ﬂow of actions on the
battleﬁeld were not at all appropriate for the Prussian army. Thus he
stated, “In War, as in art, we ﬁnd no universal forms; in neither can
a rule take the place of talent.”46 Simply, hard fast doctrinal solutions
were not desirable for modern warfare. Thus, “Universal rules (i.e.,
doctrine) and the systems built upon them therefore can have no
possible practical value.”47 While a commander obviously should
have a strategy in mind, the strategy had to be ﬂexible in order to
take advantage of opportunities that would certainly occur on the
battleﬁeld, once the ﬁrst shot was ﬁred.48 Consequently, well-trained
and experienced ofﬁcers who were able to improvise and who had
the authority to take independent action based on the emerging
situations were necessary, rather than doctrine-driven ofﬁcers.
If for no other reason, the ability of commanders to analyze the
situation and act independently provided an important element to
the battleﬁeld, what we today would call a force multiplier, speed.
Through speed and decisive action, a nation could achieve victory.
Moltke was convinced that to win wars, the key element to achieve
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a nation’s victory was the destruction of the enemy force through
battle on the ﬁeld by conducting rapid and decisive campaigns. In
his writings he noted:
Victory in the decision of arms is the most important moment in war.
It alone breaks the enemy’s will and forces him to submit to our will.
Neither the occupation of a certain piece of terrain nor the capture of
a fortiﬁed place, but only the destruction of the hostile ﬁghting force
will be decisive as a rule. It is therefore the most important object of all
operations.49

Once a nation chose war, annihilation of the enemy’s armies was the
route to victory, not the exercise of any other element of power.
Moltke understood the role of politics and national policy in
war. Clausewitz consistently emphasized that war must be based
on the extension of a nation’s politics or must be based on national
policy. Moltke, while acknowledging this fact, added that politics
and politicians had no place at all once the path to war was taken.
In short, once the nation proceeded to war, Moltke believed that
political leaders and their interests had to be removed from the
conduct of war, leaving its conduct to the professionals, the military.
Once the course of resorting to arms had been taken, politicians and
politics would do more harm than good. According to Moltke,
Policy must not be allowed to interfere in operations. In this sense, General
von Clausewitz wrote in his tactical letters to Müfﬂing (Frederich Karl
Freiherr von, an ofﬁcer partly responsible for the Prussian contribution
to the victory at Waterloo): “the task and the right of the art of war, as
opposed to policy, is mainly to prevent that policy from demanding
things which are against the nature of war and out of ignorance of the
instruments from committing errors in their use.”50

The difference of opinion about the role of the political leader
versus that of the military man came to the fore when the Prussian
army went to war against Austria in 1866. When the war began, the 65year-old intellectual Moltke, who had never commanded signiﬁcant
military formations, was at the military’s helm. Using technology—
the railroads—for the necessary speed to mobilize and move his
troops, the telegraph for communication, and the Prussian needle
gun for its proven ﬁrepower, Moltke began conducting the types of
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operations the Germans would become famous for in the following
century. With speed and determination, he set about moving his
forces to the site of battle, concentrating his army, and focusing it
on destroying the enemy force. His goal was the destruction of the
Austrian army and the defeat of Austria. Though the famed battle of
Königgrätz was a spectacular victory over Austria, a substantial part
of its army escaped destruction. The Prussian generals wanted its
destruction and wanted Prussian troops in Vienna; a simple defeat
of the army was not sufﬁcient.51 For Bismarck, however, the army’s
defeat enhanced Prussia’s role in German affairs and advanced the
stature of the Hohenzollern house. The achievement of these two
goals clearly supported the long-term objectives of both William and
Bismarck. The army’s annihilation was unnecessary.
As was noted in a previous section, that war was necessary and
that Moltke understood its goals were evident when he later wrote:
A world historical transformation of German condition, such as that which
occurred in 1866, could not have come about by peaceful conventions
and decrees. Action was required—pressure on the inside, war on the
outside. One of the many German states had to become powerful enough
to carry along the rest of them. It was King William who, through the
reform of the Prussian Army, created the power that secured unity and
the resulting liberty for Germany.52

Moltke and his superiors clashed due to his beliefs about the role of
the political leader once the ﬁrst shot of a war was ﬁred.53 Because he
felt that once the war started, the military commander should become
the preeminent leader, Bismarck and Moltke strongly disagreed,
initiating a conﬂict that would outlast both of them and would not
be resolved throughout the Imperial period. As mentioned before,
this initial conﬂict emerged when Moltke and most of his military
colleagues were irritated about the political leadership denying them
the opportunity to defeat totally the Austrian Army.
The conﬂict over the appropriate role of the politician and
general became even worse in 1870 when, through carefully laid
plans and outright chicanery, Bismarck drew the French into a war
with Prussia. The excellent mobilization machinery of the Prussian
army and its allied German states, sound tactics, and inspired
leadership allowed Prussia to deliver a signiﬁcant and rapid defeat
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to the French Army at Sedan, a victory which also sealed the fate
of Napoleon III. Remembering the disappointments of the AustroPrussian War, Moltke and his senior staff at ﬁrst held the Minister
President of Prussia at arms’ length. They had never forgiven
Bismarck for his “betrayal” after Königgrätz and for keeping them
from a complete victory over Austria. Bismarck was excluded from
military conferences, which were attended only by the Generals
and the King of Prussia. Both Bismarck and the Minister of War
Albrecht von Roon were kept in the dark about military plans. This
problem again emerged at Sedan, when Moltke, conducting his own
negotiations with the French, attempted to impose harsh peace terms
on the surrounded French army. As the French were preparing to
break off negotiations, Bismarck stepped in to restart and negotiate
the surrender.54 Bismarck wanted to avoid the complete humiliation
of France, but Moltke, representing the military point of view,
proposed less than honorable terms for the French.55
The dispute arose again when the French refused to surrender, and
the Prussian Army surrounded Paris. Bismarck wanted to bombard
Paris to force the French to surrender, but the military leadership was
opposed to using siege guns. With the Army and the Chancellor at
odds regarding the extent of the Army’s power during wartime, on
January 25, 1871, William settled the matter. On that date he issued
a directive that required Chancellor Bismarck to be informed of
military operations and have the opportunity to comment on them.
Furthermore, William clearly told Moltke not to correspond with
French authorities over surrender/peace terms until the sovereign
determined whether the Chancellor should be informed/involved.56
Thus, it would be Bismarck, the political leader, not Moltke and the
military, who would negotiate terms with the French. Once again, a
political leader and one who (in the military’s opinion) had already
squandered some of their successes with his interference again
outmaneuvered them.
Despite this philosophical disagreement, which at times was bitter,
the end result of Bismarck’s political and diplomatic maneuvers and
Moltke’s military skills was a uniﬁed Germany. Though Bismarck
prevailed over the generals, the dispute over the military’s role
once hostilities started was never completely settled. Instead, this
controversy continued to simmer over the next 2 decades. The limits
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on the military’s role in foreign relations and in politics began to
reemerge in the early 1880s. That the political leadership lost in this
conﬂict is evident by the preeminence of the military in the period
1914-18. Without a skillful and a determined political leader, the
German experience was that the military would likely dominate
politics.
The question remains, however, how or in what ways did the
entire uniﬁcation episode, and the leadership that promoted it,
contribute to, or perhaps lay the basis for, the German way of war? As
the contributions are considered, remember that the way of war that
has been analyzed is not so much a German way of war, but rather
a Prussian. Uniﬁed Germany was also a Prussianized Germany in
terms of its political and military traditions.57 The military tradition
proves by far the easiest to trace, particularly if one begins with
Moltke, who held the position of Chief of Staff of the Prussian General
Staff from 1857-71 and then Chief of the German General Staff from
1871-88. In his writings, he recognized some of Clausewitz’s basic
teachings and clearly admitted that Clausewitz’s writings had a
signiﬁcant impact on his thoughts. For example, in his comments on
strategy, he directly quoted Clausewitz, when he stated “Strategy is
the employment of battle to gain the ends of war.”58
Moltke, however, is most signiﬁcant for the way of war he espoused
and practiced, what he termed Bewegungskrieg, wars of movement.
His way of war was to conduct operations where his armies would
move rapidly, concentrate, and strike at the heart of the enemy. The
goal was to destroy its army or its will to resist, and quickly conclude
the war.59 His were wars of tactical and operational victories that
supported the goals and the political strategies developed by the
crown and the political leadership (Bismarck).
He recognized, like Clausewitz, that defense was a stronger form
of warfare.60 At the same time, he believed that the best defense a
country could have was a well-trained mobile ﬁeld army with which
to wage offensive war. As he stated, “The advantages of the offensive
are sufﬁciently known. Through the offensive, we lay down the law
of action to the opponent. He has to conform his measures to ours
and must seek the means to meet them.”61 To use this offensive army
to best defend the country, Moltke believed the superior method
to defeat and annihilate an enemy army was through the use of a
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ﬂank attack or envelopment. “The best guarantee of success of an
attack over the defense lies in a ﬂanking attack and the simultaneous
advance of all of our forces against the enemy’s ﬂank and front.”62
Moltke, who for 31 years held the position of Chief of Staff of the
most capable military force in Central Europe, essentially formed
and nurtured military thought in Germany in these formative years.
After the Franco-Prussian War concluded in 1871, the new united
Germany entered a period of peace that lasted over 40 years. During
this period, the military and political leadership had the opportunity
to ponder how best to defend the new nation. Moltke, who recognized
that Germany could not endure long wars, continued to be an avid
proponent of the short war/decisive battle and of the use of ﬂank
attacks to destroy the enemy force. Although he believed that any
prewar plans could not outlast the ﬁrst shots of a war, he also felt that
the nation’s military leadership had the responsibility of planning
for likely military contingencies. Thus, after his last great victory, the
Franco-Prussian War, he developed and repeatedly revised plans to
defend the new German Empire for the remainder of his career.
In many respects, through his writings Moltke provided the
foundation for German military thought until the end of World War
II. Likewise, his belief in the preeminence of the military over the
political leadership once hostilities began would become the accepted
practice under William II as Germany planned for and waged World
War I. History shows that this element of Moltke’s teachings would
have disastrous consequences for Germany and the world.
A ﬁnal signiﬁcant element for the Wars of Uniﬁcation is that
too many saw the operational, the tactical victories in isolation.
Thus, the defeats of Prussia’s adversaries, which proved the power
or the military prowess of Prussia, and the stunning victories at
Königsgrätz and Sedan, seemed to obscure an important fact. The
military conducted and won these campaigns in support of the goals
and the political strategies developed by Bismarck and agreed to by
his sovereign. As noted by Holger Herwig, in years to come, a newer,
post-Moltke generation:
The “demigods” of the General Staff, to use Bismarck’s term, were indeed
a new breed. Unlike the elder Moltke, they ignored the great philosophical
questions and studiously avoided deep analysis of statecraft and historical
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forces. Instead, they drew their experiences from Prussia’s victories over
Denmark, Austria, and France.63

The euphoria of wartime victories also obscured the fact that a welldeveloped set of achievable goals, logical national strategies, and
good political leadership were as important as military prowess in
ensuring the future security of a united Germany.
Through his victories and his writings, Moltke, the sword of
uniﬁcation, had laid the foundation for modern German military
thought. Conversely, the contribution of Bismarck, the political
leader, must not be overlooked. Bismarck was not a political
philosopher, but rather a determined politician who diligently
sought the accomplishment of the goals mutually agreed upon with
his sovereign. He carefully guided Prussia into the leadership role in
the uniﬁcation of Germany. Once the Franco-Prussian War concluded
in early 1871, he diligently pursued the security of the new German
Empire, protecting it from internal threats (the socialists and liberals)
and from external enemies, namely the French. He knew that a war of
revanche’ was likely since French nationalists seethed over the bitter
defeat of the Franco-Prussian War and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine.
Like Moltke, who for the remainder of his career consistently planned
for a possible war on two fronts, Bismarck consistently watched
France and worked through diplomacy to isolate the French. Though
their methods and approaches to the problem were different, they
recognized the same threat and sought to promote a secure united
Germany.
In many respects, despite the fact that Bismarck’s uncanny
political abilities gave him and the German nation many successes,
his overall impact as it relates to the German way of war is mixed.
His unique style of politics, referred to as realpolitik, showed an
almost total disregard for any standards of ethics. Furthermore,
in the example of the infamous Ems dispatch which led to the
Franco Prussian War, Bismarck was simply dishonest.64 In addition,
Bismarck, though not a soldier, did not hesitate to wage war, that is,
if it was to Prussia’s advantage. He could be incredibly talented and
polished as a diplomat, but if diplomacy did not produce what was
required for the good of Prussia, then coercion or war were paths
taken without any hesitancy, as 1864, 1866, and 1870 show.
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The future German political and military leadership failed to
learn from or ignored signiﬁcant lessons from Bismarck and his
Emperor. The ﬁrst and foremost lesson was the importance of setting
achievable, realistic goals, within the means of the new German state.
William and Bismarck never wavered from their aims of maintaining
the power and prestige of Prussia and of the house of Hohenzollern.
Too many German leaders also failed to appreciate Bismarck’s
insistence on keeping the military in its appropriate role in the state,
even in the time of war. Moltke and his associates repeatedly tried
to dominate the issues of both war and peace during the conﬂicts of
1864, 1866, and 1870, but Bismarck prevailed.
Finally, future German generations did not understand that even
when a nation has the power, the military and economic strength that
the German Empire had in the last quarter of the 19th century, such
power should not be ﬂaunted. Moderation and diplomatic ﬁnesse are
still perhaps even more important for the powerful.65 Under Bismarck,
the new German Empire learned to walk a precarious line; Germany
became the strongest economic and military power in Europe but
avoided seeking the territorial expansion of the new German Reich.
While the old balance of power in Europe was shattered, in a sense
Germany became the master balancer of power in central Europe,
sometimes courting rulers and their countries, in other situations
isolating them. When the Balkans threatened to erupt in war in 1877,
the conference to settle the issue was not the Congress of Paris, or
Vienna, but the Congress of Berlin.
In all situations, Bismarck successfully protected and advanced
the interests of the new German Empire. From the start of his
reign as Minister President of Prussia until his resignation as
Chancellor, forced by a new and impetuous Emperor William II in
1890, Bismarck dominated the political scene in Germany and often
in Europe. Bismarck, however, held his cards close to his chest,
and the complexity, at times duplicity, of his political schemes
were beyond many of his associates. Ultimately, it was Moltke’s
handpicked successor as Chief of Staff, Alfred Von Waldersee, and
the new Emperor, William II, both of whom were unconvinced of his
strategies and unable to fathom the complexity of European politics,
which brought about Bismarck’s exodus from appointive ofﬁce.
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CHAPTER 3
A RUDDERLESS SHIP OF STATE:
GERMAN SECURITY POLICY AFTER BISMARCK
The staggering course of the First and still more the Second World War
no longer permits the question to be ignored whether the seeds of later
evil were not already present in the Bismarckian Reich.
Hans Kohn66

Though the methods, strategies, or “ways” are not in keeping with
today’s standards of international conduct, the successes of Moltke
in the military realm and Bismarck as a political leader cannot be
denied. In merely a decade, their combined talents had unraveled
the Gordian knot of German uniﬁcation, strengthened Prussia and
its Hohenzollern monarchy and, for 2 additional decades, produced
in Europe what might be termed the Pax Teutonica. This chapter
brieﬂy considers the postwar goals developed by Bismarck and the
strategies he used to achieve them. It also examines the decay of a
well-developed national security strategy once Bismarck and his
sovereign were no longer in charge of Germany’s policies.
Though Moltke, more than Clausewitz, had formed the basis for
the German way of war, we must remember that this way of war, as
exhibited in the campaigns of 1864-71, was only successful through
the attainable goals and strategies established by Bismarck. As the
writer repeatedly has emphasized, Bismarck and his sovereign had
moderate and achievable goals. The writer understands that some
would question that Prussia’s goals were “reasonable,” given the
prosecution of three aggressive wars to achieve them. Certainly
French writers could be irritated by such a claim. Conversely, the
writer, while readily recognizing German excesses in both the Second
and Third Reich, stands behind this statement. After all, success did
not spoil either Bismarck or William, pushing them for excessive
territorial demands comparable to the expansionistic plans that were
devised by the leadership of the Third Reich. They established their
goals—the enhancement of Prussian power and the maintenance of
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the Hohenzollern monarchy—and once these were attained, they
sought neither additional territory nor hegemony in Europe.
Bismarck was successful and, in many respects, Germany’s famed
victories produced tangible results for the new nation because he
sought and attained a reasonable compromise for German ambitions.
After 1871, Bismarck continued this moderate path and avoided
seizing additional territory in Europe for the new German Empire.
He did not seek to impose Germany’s approach to politics on the
other European nations. In essence, this approach to Germany’s
role in Europe clearly emerged after the Franco-Prussian war, but it
was formalized during Bismarck’s famed “retreat” to Bad Kissingen
in June 1877. Away from the pressures of Berlin and internal and
external crises, the Chancellor considered the domestic and foreign
challenges that faced him and the German Empire.67 The potential
foreign threat that loomed on Germany’s horizon was an anti-German
coalition similar to that which had faced Frederick the Great in 1756,
and from which the latter only barely survived. The dread fear of
both military and political planners was an anti-German coalition,
likely led by France and allied with Russia, forcing Germany to wage
a two-front war. As a result of this analysis, Bismarck deﬁned the
road ahead as:
. . . no expansion, no push for hegemony in Europe. Germany was to be
the strongest power in Europe but without being a hegemon . . . Next
he identiﬁed a potential enemy: France. From that followed his course
of action: to create “a political situation in which all powers except
France need us.” His basic axioms were ﬁrst, no conﬂict among major
powers in central Europe; and second, German security without German
hegemony.68

Bismarck not only established these basic concepts for German
security policy, he was able to follow these constructs with few
exceptions and maintain a powerful and secure Prussianized
Germany that would have a dominant role in Europe for the next 10plus years. Though it was a military and political powerhouse and
rapidly becoming an economic powerhouse, the uniﬁed Germany
under Bismarck’s tutelage did not seek to expand in Europe either
politically or geographically.69 Granted, in the early 1880s Germany
did become involved in the race for colonies, causing it to grab
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territories in Africa, the Paciﬁc, and Asia. This brief engagement
in the colonial race is more an aberration in Bismarck’s career than
something he willingly and enthusiastically embraced.70 Internal
political pressures caused him to join the colonial race reluctantly,
rather than concentrate on goals and strategies that he had developed
for a uniﬁed Germany.71 Aside from his brief colonial excursion,
Bismarck did not seek to be an obvious hegemon in Europe or to
expand German power through territorial acquisitions in the colonial
sphere.
Although Bismarck had devised an ingenious system for the
security of a united Germany, it was his system and it depended
on his immense political talents/insights. The writer has elected to
praise Bismarck as a wily and astute politician, but the career of the
“Iron Chancellor” also highlights a major problem with the political
and military leadership of Imperial Germany. Despite all of his
capabilities, Bismarck was not immortal. His tenure in ofﬁce, like
any political or military leader, was ﬁnite. In the course of modern
German imperial history, Germany produced only one Bismarck.
From his dismissal to the end of the Imperial period it is virtually
impossible to ﬁnd political or military leaders with his insights or
his vision. Some of this problem may be attributable to the fact that
Bismarck was a solitary actor on the political scene, formulating and
even implementing Germany’s policies according to his plans, his
strategies. Many, if not most, of his plans were formulated in isolation,
and often he did not utilize, consult, or inform his subordinates of
his intentions or his actions. By nature he was not a mentor and thus
never truly groomed suitable subordinates or a true successor that
could so adroitly understand and manipulate European politics.72
With his passing, a vacuum was certain to develop, that is, until a
capable leader could emerge. Regrettably for both Germany and
Europe, such an astute political leader never did emerge.
While in today’s world of political correctness it might seem
inappropriate to bemoan the passing of an avowed autocrat like
Bismarck, one must, in fact, bemoan the passing of the world order he
created after 1870. Consider that it is no exaggeration that Bismarck’s
diplomacy, in the wake of the Wars of Uniﬁcation, made Berlin the
center of European diplomacy for roughly 2 decades. Other than
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during the Balkan crisis of the late 1870s, which Bismarck helped to
resolve, Europe was at peace for the remainder of the century. Even
when elements within the General Staff attempted to push Germany
into war during the Bulgarian crisis of the late 1880s, Bismarck, in
his waning years, masterfully defused this crisis.73 Granted, tensions
existed and crises emerged, but they were settled by diplomacy
rather than by the sword.74 The reasons for these successes were
Bismarck’s talents and that German goals—security strategy, as well
as its foreign policy—focused on the sovereign’s and Chancellor’s
shared goals. This resulted in a consistency in policy that brought
stability to both Germany and Europe.
Another signiﬁcant element for his success, often ignored, was
his subordination of the Prussian/German military to civilian
control. The attempts by the General Staff and by former military
ofﬁcers to devise strategies and plans that were in conﬂict with his
designed European order were reoccurring, but while Bismarck was
Chancellor and William I Emperor, the military was kept in its proper
subordinate role. Conﬂicts still emerged between the Chancellor and
the military, but William I, despite his
life-long love of the military, normally
backed down or acquiesced to the
Chancellor. Once William I passed
away and when Bismarck ceased to
be Chancellor, this orderly world
quickly unraveled.75 Interestingly, it
began to unravel over issue of how
best to defend Germany.
Since the end of the Wars of
German uniﬁcation, Bismarck and
Moltke had been concerned about
a possible war on two fronts, with
Germany being sandwiched between
the French and the Russian armies.
After the successful conclusion of the
Franco-Prussian War, a signiﬁcant
amount of Bismarck’s diplomatic The aged Otto von Bismarck and the
energy was focused on preventing
New Emperor of Germany (author’s
collection)
France and Russia from reaching any
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accommodation. In Bismarck’s world of interlocking alliances, Russia
was an ally of Germany. This was initially accomplished through the
Three Emperor’s League (1873) that bound the three monarchies—
German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian—together and excluded
Republican France. When friction between Austria-Hungary and
Russia made this alliance unstable, Bismarck negotiated a secret
alliance between Russia and Germany referred to as the Reinsurance
Treaty (1887). Although some of Germany’s leadership, to include
Moltke, was convinced that Russia was a long-term threat, during
Bismarck’s tenure, skillful, at times devious, diplomacy kept the
German and Russian alliance intact and maintained the isolation of
“revolutionary” and democratically minded France.76
Nonetheless, Moltke stewed about the recovery of French
military capabilities, Russian military strength, and, in the event that
Russia and France became allies, the best strategy to ﬁght a twofront war. The modern technology he had used so well in the Wars
of Uniﬁcation and his understanding of the lethality of the modern
battleﬁeld, due to the increased ﬁrepower, made him uncertain that
rapid and clear-cut victories—like those of 1866 or 1870-71—were
still possible.77 Perhaps it was no longer possible to achieve the 19th
century general’s dream—the destruction of the adversary’s army.
He also was certain that diplomatic initiatives alone would not be
able to solve Germany’s unique problem, i.e., being sandwiched
between France and Russia and thus the necessity of waging a
two-front war. By the 1880s, additional senior German military
leaders expressed great concern about the inherent incompatibility
of a German/Russian alliance. According to the senior military
leadership, improved Russian military capabilities, as demonstrated
by the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, meant that Russia had the
potential of posing a serious threat to the German Empire.78 In the
opinion of many of Germany’s senior military leaders—virtually all
with General Staff ties—the aging Bismarck was failing to recognize
the problem. Still, with his power and capabilities, Bismarck managed
to keep the doubters at bay.
Bismarckian strategy was undercut and began to go awry both
through the issue of the potential threat posed by Russia and through
a second issue that never truly went away—the subordination of the
military to civilian control. In the 1880s, these two issues in a sense
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merged, causing Bismarck’s diplomatic “house of cards” to collapse.
The issue of civilian control centered on to whom the famed General
Staff reported and what the role of its leadership was in advising the
political leadership on Germany’s strategy and on foreign relations.
During the wars against Denmark, Austria, and France, Moltke
chaffed against what he had regarded as unreasonable restrictions
imposed by the Chancellor in the Army’s war efforts. As mentioned
in the previous chapter, Moltke and most of the key German military
leadership felt that after the ﬁrst shot had been ﬁred, the nation’s
strategy, the conduct of the war, and negotiations to conclude the
war should be left in the hands of the military. Furthermore, as chief
of the General Staff, Moltke felt that he should be able to report
directly to the Emperor on the conduct of the war and the prospects
of peace rather than through the War Minister or the Chancellor.
In Moltke’s eyes, the chief of the General Staff and the Chancellor
should be equal, with one controlling the military sphere, the other
the political.
At the same time, there was not always a clear agreement
between the General Staff and the War Ministry as to the limits on
each ofﬁce’s authority, which also provided a source of conﬂict.
Since the period of military reform at the early part of the 19th
century, authored by Scharnhorst, et. al, all sections of the military
administrative structure had been subordinate to the War Ministry,
a civilian part of the government.79 This system was, to say the least,
unique. For example, the development of German military policy
was the responsibility of the sovereign, the Minister of War, the
Naval Ofﬁce, the Admiralty Staff, and, ﬁnally, the Reich Chancery.
The War Minister was an active duty ofﬁcer who, though a serving
military ofﬁcer, had responsibilities to both houses of the German
parliament. At the same time, this ofﬁcer was responsible to the
Emperor for the preparedness of the Army. The General Staff, whose
prestige had grown consistently during the middle part of the 19th
century, had no real legal authority to direct any of the military entities
mentioned above and had no ofﬁcial role in the formulation of the
nation’s security strategy. It had become more powerful through an
evolutionary policy and its prestige, rather than through statutory
change. The General Staff’s prestige soared as a result of the Wars
of Uniﬁcation and, despite its military capabilities clearly proven
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between 1864-71, it was increasingly uncomfortable due to its lack of
legal status in the governmental structure and its subordinate role to
this unnecessarily confusing military/civilian bureaucracy.
Despite the maze of military, nonmilitary, and pseudo military
entities, sometimes the system functioned well. During the Wars of
Uniﬁcation, Moltke, as Chief of the Prussian General Staff, worked
well with his trusted colleague, War Minister General Albrecht Roon.
Moltke felt personally and professionally responsible to keep Roon
informed, but he did not deem providing information and plans
to the minister to be a legal responsibility. Roon, though a general
ofﬁcer and a friend, had to be kept in his place because his line of
responsibility was to the civilian government, not the military in
general, or the General Staff in particular.
In the years following the Franco-Prussian War, Moltke, as a
national hero, was successful in adding some additional powers to the
General Staff, but the correct chain of command between the Chief of
the General Staff and the Emperor and the issue of the subordination
of the General Staff to a civilian authority were contentious. In many
ways the political currents in the 1870s and 1880s may have made
the pressure for a more independent General Staff—with direct
access to the Emperor—even more pressing. In the eyes of the ruling
class, the rising demand in the Reichstag for democratic changes
made the Prussian/German army in general and the General Staff
in particular seem like a bastion of stability.80 The General Staff was,
after all, a well-organized and well-trained group of ofﬁcers which
schooled its future leaders and perpetuated its values. Given the
successes of the Wars of Uniﬁcation, the General Staff seemed to
offer the best hope as the strongest link, the Imperial Guard of the
Hohenzollern monarchy. In short, the General Staff as the crème del
la crème of the army was a dependable bulwark for the monarchy
against what appeared to be the rising tide of both socialism and the
democratization of the Second Reich.81
In the early 1880s, the military leadership that supported a more
independent General Staff achieved several signiﬁcant victories. First,
by Imperial Order on March 8, 1883, the Division of Personnel of the
War Ministry was abolished and the responsibility was shifted to the
Military Cabinet. Following this action, on May 24 of the same year,
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an Imperial Order gave the Chief of the General Staff and his Deputy
direct access to the Emperor.82 Even though this would appear to be
an obvious example of the General Staff slipping away from proper
“civilian” control, these changes did not alarm Bismarck, who was a
civilian, rather than a military ofﬁcer.83 The “Iron Chancellor” seemed
willing to allow an increase in the General Staff’s autonomy, since
it served as an imperial bulwark against the liberals and socialists
with whom the Chancellor consistently sparred and against whom
he waged a consistent low intensity conﬂict.
In all likelihood, Bismarck tolerated these military incursions
into his realm because through his power, his persona, he was still
able to maintain civilian control over the military. Through General
Staff intrigues, however, the potential for major problems between
the Chancellor and the General Staff had increased signiﬁcantly.
Only Bismarck’s power, the Emperor’s tendency to back him, and
Moltke’s understanding of the Chancellor’s power averted major
conﬂict. Even the casual observer would recognize the avoidance of
a conﬂict was the result of Bismarck’s persona, rather than through
parameters set by either statute or imperial decree. Conversely, all of
this would change, as would the key personalities involved. By the
late 1880s, all of the principals—William I, Bismarck, and Moltke—
were in the twilight period of their lives, and without comparable
strong leadership, the ability of civilian authority to resist military
intrusions into the realm of strategy and national security policy
would fade.
Moltke retired as Chief of Staff in 1887, at the advanced age of
88. Still sharp witted and astute, he was increasingly concerned
about the possibility of a war, a war on two fronts. In preparation
for his retirement, Moltke gave a classic speech to the Reichstag.
Although he is best remembered for making war, for his role in the
Wars of German Uniﬁcation, in this period of his life he genuinely
was concerned about a future war which Germany might be
unable to win and could cost the country its gains from the wars
of 1866-71. Thus he issued a strong warning to the deputies and
military leaders gathered there: “woe be unto those who set Europe
aﬂame and who ﬁrst ignites the powder keg.”84 Unfortunately, a
new aggressive group of military and political leaders were not
listening.
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Approaching a long overdue retirement, Moltke had groomed
General Count Alfred von Waldersee as his successor. Waldersee
was a talented and experienced military ofﬁcer but one who did not
recognize his limitations. Bismarck, who came to dislike and distrust
him, stated that Waldersee never knew “how to restrict himself to
his military calling.”85 Though a soldier, he aspired and conspired to
move into the political realm where he believed he had considerable
talent. Waldersee even had aspirations to become Chancellor when
the Bismarck retired. Due to his political ambitions, he was quite
different from his mentor who was never regarded as a statesman
nor was he ever recognized as an important political thinker. Moltke
was a soldier through and through. The months following Moltke’s
retirement show that Waldersee should have followed his mentor’s
lead.
As Chief of Staff, Waldersee, like Moltke, sincerely believed that
Russia was an ever-growing threat due to its increased military
capabilities. It seemed to escape Waldersee that Bismarck’s system
was based on the concept that France posed the greatest threat to
Germany, rather than Russia being a long-term friend or ally to
Germany. In reality, an alliance with Russia was only a stopgap
measure to prevent Russia from falling into the eager arms of France.
Bismarck understood that, in the long term, an alliance between the
German and Russian Empires was illogical. A treaty with the Russians
served to keep Russia comfortable with its German neighbor, given
the Russian discomfort with the growing power of the German
Empire and distrust of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. An alliance
with Russia was for Bismarck a necessity, since the failure to provide
Russia with such a security blanket could very easily push it into
an accommodation with France, a nation he had worked so hard to
isolate.
Waldersee, however, lacked these strategic insights. He saw no
virtue in such arrangements or perhaps was not astute enough to
understand such concepts. Regrettably, he seemed to know more
what he did not want, rather than what he did want, as it related to
German security policy. Thus, as succinctly summarized by Gunther
Rothenberg “. . . Count Alfred von Waldersee, who in 1888 became
Von Moltke’s successor, never formed a consistent strategic policy.”86
Thus, when the Reinsurance Treaty came up for renewal, he would
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join a newly appointed Chancellor in opposing its renewal. In his
opinion, the treaty only gave advantages to the Russians.
Waldersee’s elevation to Chief of the General Staff surfaced
another issue. Like many of his General Staff colleagues, he believed
in the independence of the General Staff both from the War Minister
and from any entity that had responsibilities to civilian authority.
From almost the onset of his appointment as Quartermaster General
in 1882, he began intrigues against the War Minister whose authority
over the General Staff he sought to undercut. The neutering of the
War Minister’s powers, previously described, reached their climax
in 1883 when the Chief of the General Staff and his deputy were
granted direct access to the Emperor. This happened through a
prearranged deal with the incoming War Minister, General Paul
Bronsart von Schellendorf.87 Bismarck himself was in sympathy with
the sentiments of Moltke and Waldersee because he was concerned
about the fact that a “civilian” ministry had an intermediary position
between the Army and the Emperor.88 What Bismarck, despite all of
his insights, either failed to appreciate or underestimated, was the
ability of the General Staff ofﬁcers to undercut his diplomacy, his
alliances, and his long-term strategy of preventing Germany from
being faced with a two-front war. In all likelihood, he thought that
he could outmaneuver them but, despite his advanced age, he failed
to recognize how limited his tenure would be.89
A second major change in the German political scene as it
related Germany’s security strategy and civilian-military relations
began with the ascension of Crown Prince Frederick to the throne
in March 1888. Frederick III and his wife were rightfully regarded
as friends of the liberal parliamentary opposition and were viewed
with suspicion by the conservative elements within the military and
the Prussian establishment. For certain, they were far less arbitrary
in their approach than previous sovereigns or, for that matter, the
Chancellor. With their democratic ideals, they seemed destined to
put Germany on a decidedly different path.
Frederick, however, would never have the opportunity to make a
signiﬁcant impact on Germany because, at the time of his coronation,
he had already been diagnosed with throat cancer. Seriously ill, he
was unable to speak at his coronation and was destined to only
rule for 99 days before his untimely death. To further complicate
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the political scene, during Frederick’s brief reign, Bismarck was
still Chancellor, and he quietly but systematically undermined the
new sovereign in all ways possible. Appointments and plans of the
Emperor, and particularly those of the Empress who he genuinely
disliked, were subject to his intrigues.90 After an uneventful 99 days
on the throne, Frederick passed away and, with his passing, the
hopes of Germany’s liberals quickly evaporated. The crown passed
to his eldest child, Frederick William Victor Albert, better known
in history as William II, or to American readers, Kaiser William.
Father and son could not have been more different in personality or
interests.
It is hard to describe accurately the new Emperor without
appearing to be biased against him. At best, William was a unique
individual. He was a bright young man—not yet 30 when he
ascended the throne—and a dynamo of human energy. Had he
been born in today’s world, he might have been characterized as
having attention deﬁcit disorder or certainly as a hyperactive child.
Virtually from the time of his birth, he was in constant motion,
seemingly unable to sit still or focus on any one thing too long.91 In
addition to this excessive energy, whatever the cause, William was
also physically handicapped. His left shoulder had been severely
damaged in a difﬁcult birth, causing his left arm to be visibly smaller
and very weak. In addition to being excessively energetic, he seemed
determined to prove himself to be equal, if not superior, to other
men. Thus, he relished the life and the trappings of soldiering.92 He
loved and excelled in the physical and mental challenges of the hunt
and of outdoor life. As Emperor, he was known for his incessant
traveling all over the globe, causing his subjects to refer to him as the
“ReiseKaiser,” the traveling Kaiser. He had an unbelievable range of
interests and could be extremely charming to friend and foe alike.
When faced by serious crises, however, his responses were all too
often not reasoned or diplomatic. Instead, the Emperor often replied
with off-the-cuff comments and, all too often, irrational outbursts.
Prior to becoming Emperor, William’s relationship with Bismarck
had been extremely good because the elder statesman recognized
the advantages of being attentive and complementary to the young
prince. Once William took the throne, however, Bismarck failed to
realize that the new Emperor would not be content to acquiesce
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to the Chancellor’s plans, as had his
grandfather. The new emperor meant
to be actively involved in the affairs of
government and intended to rule and
set policy, not acquiesce to his ministers.
Bismarck had always acknowledged the
Emperor’s authority and frequently used
this to his own advantage. Thus, when his
critics questioned policies and practices,
the old Chancellor reminded them that
he could only set policy and establish
priorities with the Emperor’s consent.
In short, he was stating that his ideas
had already been given the Emperor’s
William II (author’s collection)
stamp of approval. Though he often used
this tactic to shore up his position, in
reality, as long as William I was on the throne, he normally had the
Emperor’s agreement or acquiescence to his policies. As was also his
practice, when William began to formulate his own ideas on matters
of policy which did not agree with his plans, Bismarck intrigued
against the young Emperor and tried to ignore his plans and policies.
The impetuous sovereign refused to tolerate such behavior, despite
Bismarck’s stature. By 1890 Chancellor and sovereign were clearly at
loggerheads, and Bismarck, after a rather stormy meeting on March
15, 1889, resigned from ofﬁce.
When Bismarck lost William II’s conﬁdence and was forced to
retire, the young and impetuous sovereign was soon faced with a
signiﬁcant decision that related to Germany’s security, the renewal
of the Reinsurance Treaty. Although William was originally inclined
to renew the treaty, he had a newly appointed Chancellor, Leo Von
Caprivi, who was inexperienced in the policial realm. Though a
distinguished military ofﬁcer and a capable administrator, Caprivi
had limited knowledge about either domestic politics or foreign
policy. He almost immediately was confronted by the Reinsurance
Treaty but was at a decided disadvantage since he had not even seen
its text. Thus he was easily convinced by elements in the Foreign
Ministry that the treaty was not in Germany’s interests. Caprivi, at
the urging of ofﬁcials in the Foreign Ministry, in turn convinced the
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Kaiser that a renewal beneﬁted Russia far more than it did Germany.93
With Waldersee’s opposition, as previously mentioned, the Kaiser
did not renew the treaty. The Emperor and his chancellor discovered
too late that there were, in fact, signiﬁcant advantages for Germany
in the treaty’s renewal. If nothing else, it was a signiﬁcant bulwark
again the dread fear of both Bismarck and Moltke, a Russian-French
alliance. Thus, despite Russian interest, Germany failed to renew the
treaty and, through this action, destroyed Russia’s security blanket.
With this mantel of security removed, the Russians began to seek
accommodation with France. In 1890 the French and Russians drew up
a military convention, which promoted a closer working relationship
between the two countries. Collaboration was successful between
Russia and France, and in 1894 relations warmed even further with
the signing of a formal alliance. The dread fear of both Bismarck and
Moltke had become a reality. Germany was sandwiched between an
unfriendly alliance, raising the specter of a two-front war. Although
the General Staff, aided by the Foreign ofﬁce, had won their long
hard battle in derailing a renewal of the alliance, in the end they
were the major losers. Now German planners would have to develop
a winning strategy for a war on two fronts.
Although elements within the Army’s senior leadership like
Waldersee were in part to blame for torpedoing the Reinsurance
Treaty, the military, the new Chancellor, and the Foreign Ministry
were all involved. Each had their own rationale for opposing the
treaty. The Army opposed the treaty based on a perceived threat
from the Russian Empire, a position held by both Moltke and his
successor. With Russia’s military capabilities on the rise and military
spending increasing, if a war was to occur with the Russians, it would
be better for it to occur while they were comparatively weak.94 The
real hotbed of opposition to the treaty’s renewal, however, was the
Foreign Ministry. Even as Bismarck had subordinated the military
to his authority, he also dominated and often ignored the Foreign
Ofﬁce. The Young Turks of this ofﬁce, led by Friedrich von Holstein,
were convinced that Bismarck’s efforts to integrate Russia into the
mainstream of the European security system and keep it away from an
alliance with France were doomed to failure. Freed from Bismarck’s
heavy hand, the Foreign Ofﬁce advised against the renewal, and
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Waldersee, an important voice in William’s inner council, worked to
convince the young and impressionable Emperor that renewing the
treaty was not in Germany’s best interest.95
This failure to renew the treaty was serious but not fatal for
Germany’s national security strategy. The problem was that neither
the new Chancellor nor the senior military ofﬁcers who opposed
Bismarck’s system developed a new comprehensive security plan
or a set of guiding principles to replace the overarching principles
established by Bismarck. Their focus had been on unraveling
Bismarck’s strategy, his complex system of alliances and agreements,
but they failed to develop a logical system to replace it. Perhaps
they had served too long under the ﬁrm and autocratic hand of this
solitary actor on the world scene who stiﬂed subordinates and whose
schemes and strategies were often too complex for those around
him. If these ofﬁcers/ofﬁcials had developed a workable alternative
strategy that satisﬁed Germany’s security needs, it would have been
another matter, but they offered no clear azimuth to chart the future
course for Germany. Likely they failed to appreciate Bismarck’s
concept of being the hegemon, sitting in the cockpit of the European
craft, but without exhibiting the arrogance that comes with the seat
of leadership.
Equally important, under Bismarck
and William I, the political leadership
had used the military to attain their
basic goals, but at the same time kept
the military at bay.96 Bismarck, the
political leader, maintained ﬁrm control
of the nation’s national security strategy
and sought to retain the gains of the
period of 1864-71 but without posing
additional threats to his neighbors. This
formula was as logical in 1890 as it was
in 1877. The problem was that Bismarck
was gone!
Once Bismarck no longer controlled
Germany’s destiny, the country’s secu“Dropping the Pilot”
rity strategy became exceptionally
Punch, March 29, 1890
difﬁcult to determine.97 That William
(author’s collection)
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wanted a powerful and secure Germany is beyond a doubt, but
his policies and those of his political and military advisers were
not clearly focused, nor were they based on political realities. It is
unfortunate for Europe in general and Germany in particular that
William II never had his own retreat to Bad Kissingen where he
thought through and established his achievable goals for the nation.
This, however, would have been too much to ask. To give thoughtful
and analytical consideration of precisely what his goals were for
Germany and how these could be accomplished was simply out of
character for the new Kaiser. He had neither the will nor the discipline
to accomplish such an organized approach and, at the same time, he
did not have an experienced politician like Bismarck to moderate his
whims. That he desired the new and increasingly powerful German
nation to achieve its place in the sun is evident from the onset of his
reign, but speciﬁc goals and policies or logical strategies to achieve
this were often ill-conceived and lacked reality.
Was Germany destined to descend on the slippery slope
toward 1914, once Bismarck had departed and the young Emperor
increasingly was involving himself in both military matters and
matters of state? Not necessarily, but Bismarck’s retirement, the
coronation of a new Emperor, the increase of the General Staff power,
and the absence of clearly enunciated goals caused Germany’s
security strategy to slowly but steadily go awry. Had Germany’s
failure to renew the Reinsurance Treaty been an isolated instance,
perhaps Germany could have recovered. It was, however, the ﬁrst
of many signiﬁcant errors. To further compound the problem, the
number of players who affected Germany’s security policy began to
burgeon. Beginning with the Reinsurance Treaty ﬁasco, the Foreign
Ministry, which Bismarck had always dominated, began to affect the
country’s security policy. The ministry found the alliance with Russia
to be an unnatural act since, in terms of both military power and
commercial competition, alliance with an emerging potential enemy
made little sense. Bismarck’s other alliances and secret agreements
and diplomacy were simply too complicated for the ofﬁcials in this
ministry, some of whom had long disagreed with his policies. They
favored the Triple Alliance, which brought together three “natural”
allies: Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary. In addition, the Foreign
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Ministry believed that beyond the Triple Alliance, a more logical
alliance for the German Empire was closer ties to, and hopefully, in
the end, an alliance with Britain.
German attempts to draw closer to Britain resulted in even more
complications for Germany’s post-Bismarckian era. To win British
favor, they negotiated a colonial territorial settlement in Africa with
Britain that was unusually generous to the British.98 This land giveaway was done in the hope that this would be one of many agreements
with the British that would involve the island nation in continental
politics and in support of German plans. For the ﬁrst 3 years of the
1890s, the Foreign Ministry worked to promote closes ties with
Britain, ties which they hoped would result in Britain edging toward
a bona ﬁde alliance with Germany. In this venture, they were totally
unsuccessful. The Foreign Ministry and the Ambassador to Britain,
Paul von Hartzfeldt, failed to understand the British. In the 1890s
Britain was not at all interested in becoming entangled in continental
alliances. This was not completely an isolationist approach, rather it
was because the British were very much involved in colonial affairs,
as well as with internal issues. Therefore they sought to avoid any
entanglement in continental affairs. After several attempts at wooing
the British, it ﬁnally became obvious that the Island kingdom was
not interested, particularly if it meant embroiling it in European
squabbles.
Even as attempts continued at wooing the British, Paul Kayser,
chief of the Colonial Section of the Foreign Ministry, further confused
the main thrust of German policy. He believed that Germany could
enhance its status among the world powers by being the international
arbiter in disputes over colonies, a role accepted with signiﬁcant
enthusiasm by the Emperor. While on the surface such an initiative
seemed to have some degree of merit, in reality it merely spelled
more trouble for the Germans. Because the world’s two major
colonial powers were France and Great Britain, this tactic was a sure
recipe to fuel the ever-burning anti-German ﬁres in France and, at
the same time, irritate, if not alienate, the British. After all, to be an
arbiter requires signiﬁcant diplomatic skills, and if these skills are not
present, the arbiter can become the target of the disputant’s wrath.
To confuse the overall thrust of foreign policy even more, Germany
made concurrent, though belated, attempts to repair the damage to
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relations with Russia, which had resulted
from the failure to renew the Reinsurance
Treaty, in hopes of negating the French/
Russian rapprochement. As a ﬁnal complication, the Emperor, ever impetuous
and seldom patient, became concerned
about the German diplomacy and security
issues. He became increasingly involved
in foreign affairs; and, after watching
the muddled diplomacy, he, too, became
part of the crowded ﬁeld of those dealing
with diplomacy and strategy. Although
initially interested in better relations with
Britain, he soon wearied of courting his
William II with his cousin “Nicky”
(Tsar Nicholar II) on board the
cousins in London and determined that
Hohenzollern. (Author’s collecthe British were not all that dependable,
tion)
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not really worth the effort. Then he
involved himself personally in an attempt to repair relations with
the Russians. Since little progress was evident with one side of his
family, the British cousins, he promoted a friendship with another
cousin, Czar Nicholas II, attempting to reverse the previous falling
out. In this initiative, he was no more successful than his ministers.
The crowded world of foreign affairs, alliances, and security
policy became even more complicated because William allowed or
promoted more military input into the development of his policies.
Even though the military—speciﬁcally the Chief of the General
Staff—already had direct access to the Kaiser and thus had the
opportunity to affect directly Germany’s security policy, the Kaiser
added more military input and more complexity. In 1889, shortly after
becoming emperor, he put his military advisors together into what
was called a “royal headquarters,” a military organization consisting
of aid-de-decamps, adjutants, and assorted others, all under their
own commanding general, which even further linked the emperor
to military advisors. With the adoption of the Constitution of 1849,
the emperor had speciﬁc military powers, but William II took his
military authority and his ties to the military even further than his
grandfather, William I had.100

45

Adding to the militarization of security policy as well as irritants
to British/German relations was the inﬂuence and naval programs
of Admiral Alfred Tirpitz. His inﬂuence in German security policy
increased considerably from 1890-1914. He had an obvious entrée’
into the inner circles of government because he knew Leo Caprivi.
Both he and Caprivi, Chancellor from 1890-94, were Naval ofﬁcers
by background. In fact, prior to his entry into the political realm,
Caprivi had been in charge of the German admiralty (beginning in
1883). Thus, the two men had a common background and a similar
view of German security. Tirpitz became a signiﬁcant ﬁgure because
he had a clear but dangerous vision for Germany’s security policy.
Tirpitz was the apostle of expanding the German Navy, building
a high seas ﬂeet that would put Germany in direct competition, if
not conﬂict, with Great Britain. The Navy was a military element
that had been virtually nonexistent through the 1864-70 Wars of
Uniﬁcation. It began a signiﬁcant expansion in the early 1890s once
William II became emperor.101 The young impressionable Kaiser had
a life-long love affair with the German Navy. For him, the Navy,
with its powerful capital vessels, was visible proof of the power and
authority of the German Empire which could be projected around
the world.
Tirpitz, who would ultimately become Secretary of State of
the Imperial Naval Ofﬁce, sought to build a battle ﬂeet that was
comparable to the British ﬂeet. Though it likely would be smaller
in the overall number of vessels, he thought that the German ﬂeet,
with the latest in the technology of the
period, would actually have superior
capabilities. Tirpitz was convinced
that Britain, in fact, posed a signiﬁcant
stumbling block in Germany’s drive
to its place in the sun.102 In his opinion,
the only way Germany could achieve
the desired great power status was
to develop the power, that is, a ﬂeet
that the British would respect. Thus,
from the onset, the construction of a
powerful high seas ﬂeet was directed The Emperor, Tirpitz, and Moltke
(the younger).
against Britain; it was not merely a
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generic program for the purpose of expanding/extending Germany’s
power or to protect its own ﬂeet. Tirpitz believed that if and when a
naval confrontation took place, it would likely occur in the North Sea
and, if Germany was up to the task, would be a cataclysmic battle in
which British sea power could be destroyed.
The naval race and the efforts of the Foreign Ministry to serve
as a mediator in colonial conﬂicts meant that the Germans were
becoming an irritant to the British in two separate arenas. Despite
this fact, even as they pursued courses that were bound to irritate the
British, elements within the Foreign Ministry held the hope, even the
desire, that Britain and Germany could reach an amicable agreement
on their respective places as world powers in the soon-to-arrive 20th
century. Thus, a ﬂirtation of sorts continued between the British and
the Germans, with the latter playing an on again-off again wooing
game yet, at the same time, establishing a sufﬁciently high cost for
friendship. Mixed signals from Berlin further complicated the picture
as to what type of arrangements the Germans sought between the
two nations. This dangerous and amateurish game of diplomacy
continued into the ﬁrst decade of the
20th century.
What becomes obvious at this point
is that the military element of power
was becoming much more signiﬁcant
in forming, or at least affecting, German
security policy. Brigade General Dr.
Günter Roth, formerly Chief of the
Bundeswehr’s Military History Research
Ofﬁce, explained this by stating the
increasing inﬂuence of the German
military:
. . . was the fault of Bismarck’s successors,
who carelessly squandered his legacy. The
ﬁrst Chancellor’s alliance policy, aimed at
establishing a balance of power, was not
continued, and the German Reich all of a
sudden found itself encircled from all sides
and isolated. The politicians now looked like
defaulters with a bankrupt estate on their hands.
The vacuum was ﬁlled by the generals.103
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Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz
who added to the German
strategic dilemma in the two
decades before the outbreak of
World War I. (photo courtesy of
USAMHI)

In the author’s opinion, it is inaccurate to state that the military had
to step into this role because of a vacuum in civilian leadership.
At the same time, it is also an error to simply point a ﬁnger at the
military—speciﬁcally the General Staff—and accuse them or the
senior leadership of diabolical schemes, which made them the
signiﬁcant force in formulating Germany’s security policy and its
military strategy. In reality the blame should be shared.
The difﬁculty in assessing the military’s role is due to the
ineffective political leadership at the national level. The Chancellor’s
ofﬁce, in particular, was exceedingly weak. Germany had come into
being as a united country through the plans and strategies devised
by Otto von Bismarck. Once this process was completed, Bismarck,
as Chancellor, dominated internal affairs, determined what was
necessary for the new nation’s security, and devised strategies
relating to foreign relations to keep Germany’s enemies at bay. Longterm security problems and the threat that faced Germany—a war on
two fronts—were averted through the complex but effective system
of alliances developed by the Chancellor. Once Bismarck resigned, it
was impossible to ﬁnd a nonuniformed political leader who had the
capabilities of either effectively carrying on the Chancellor’s policies
or developing a consistent azimuth that would allow Germany
to enter securely into the 20th century with the stature it desired.
Granted, with the new ebullient Kaiser, it would have been difﬁcult
to ﬁnd a political leader who could have controlled or manipulated
him.
Not only was there not another Bismarck waiting in the wings,
there was not a Moltke. Although Moltke chaffed under the civilian
control (i.e., Bismarck) of the military, he recognized the value of
diplomacy when it came to a nation realizing its goals, and he knew
that Bismarck had the conﬁdence of the crown. He was well aware
of the value of utilizing elements of power other than the military
to achieve the nation’s goals. Given his experiences in the Wars
of Uniﬁcation, and in particular the Franco-Prussian War, he was
concerned that the technology available on the battleﬁeld might
make short and conclusive wars, wars that resulted in the destruction
of the enemy’s army on the battleﬁeld, unlikely. Though he stewed
about and planned for a future conﬂict, he was uncertain that wars
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like those fought from 1866-71 would give Germany future victories.
Conversely, he was certain that diplomacy alone could not solve
Germany’s strategic dilemma, particularly as it related to France.
After the Bismarck/Moltke era ended, diplomacy and any type
of serious strategic thought appeared to expire, as did the terms
of ofﬁce of these two men. As mentioned previously, the Foreign
Ministry pursued its schemes, some of which bore little relationship
to reality, and few of which produced anything tangible for German
security policy. The Chancellor attempted to deal with alliances and
potential conﬂicts, internal and external, but seemed to have no longterm plan concerning how best to improve Germany’s security. While
civilian authority wrestled with half-baked schemes or retreads of
Bismarck’s alliance system, in the military arena there was a group of
aggressive ofﬁcers who, like Moltke, believed that diplomacy alone
could not solve Germany’s defensive dilemma. Unlike Moltke, they
believed, even in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, that quick
and decisive victories could replicate Moltkian-style victories. Thus,
through the military means alone, Germany’s dilemma of a war on
two fronts was solvable. The acid test of their theories would not
come until 1914.
Without the Chancellor’s participation, although he had no
inclination to participate anyway, they began to plan for the next
war, again with no clear national security strategy. Taking Moltke
as a pattern, they began planning for swift campaigns to defeat
France, then Russia, using technology, as had the master, and using
the favored tactic, ﬂanking maneuvers or, better yet, envelopments
to destroy the enemy’s forces. Was there a goal, a clear azimuth for
Germany comparable to what Bismarck had established in 1877?
Was the increasingly militarized policy/strategy goal still promoting
policies that were for the good of a greater Prussia/Germany and the
maintenance of the Hohenzollern dynasty? Was Germany still seeking
no additional territorial gains and attempting to be the hegemon of
Europe, without appearing or seeming to be the hegemon? Or was
it to return to the position of being in the cockpit of the European
vessel, as Germany had been between 1877-89, serving as the arbiter
of Europe? Or did anyone, to include the Kaiser, know for sure?
As the civilian leadership wallowed in indecision and impractical
schemes, the military became increasingly signiﬁcant in planning.
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The question must be raised, how well was the German ofﬁcer corps
prepared for such tasks, i.e., strategic planning and inﬂuencing
foreign policy? This factor deserves a careful examination.
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CHAPTER 4
THE EDUCATION OF AN OFFICER CORPS
Tactics reigned supreme in Prussia. The system concentrated on the nuts
and bolts of the military profession.
Holger H. Herwig104

As the German military establishment began to involve itself
more in the nation’s strategy formation, two factors should be
considered: German ofﬁcer education, and overall experience level
of the ofﬁcer corps. From the mid-19th century until the eve of
World War I, German ofﬁcer education was largely focused on the
tactical level of war and gave ofﬁcers few, if any, opportunities to
study strategy and strategy formulation on the highest political and
military levels. Since the German military establishment was, in fact,
based on the Prussian military establishment, a look at the evolution
of the Prussian ofﬁcer educational system, its curriculum, and how
its educational system functioned is important.
The Prussian educational system had its origins in the Napoleonic
period. Napoleon’s successes in the early part of the 19th century
resulted in several serious defeats for the Prussian army. These
defeats were so catastrophic to the nation that some questioned
whether a strong and independent Prussia would continue to exist.
In the midst of these defeats, a cabal of reformers, to include Baron
vom Stein, David Gerhard von Scharnhorst, August Gneisenau,
Hermann von Boyen, and C.V.G. von Grolman, worked to initiate a
series of major reforms for the Prussian army, including the selection
and education of ofﬁcers. This reform movement was nourished
through the establishment of the Militärische Gesellschaft (Military
Society) in Berlin in 1801, a voluntary association that had comparable
organizations in other German cities.105
A key individual in educational reform was David Gerhard
von Scharnhorst. This ofﬁcer was an outstanding performer on the
battleﬁeld and a deep thinker. He had only been appointed to Prussian
service in 1801, but he quickly became a major player in the reform
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movement. His interest in ofﬁcer education resulted in Scharnhorst’s
establishment of an academy for young talented ofﬁcers in 1804. Its
existence, however, was brief for, after the disastrous battles of Jena
and Auerstadt in 1806, the academy was closed. In the following
year, the ofﬁcer education program was scrutinized carefully. As
a result, reforms were instituted that laid the foundations for the
Prussian/German educational system.
The reforms to the Prussian system went beyond merely the
schools and their curriculums. The changes included both ofﬁcer
selection and education. The reformers promoted the philosophy
that leadership potential and academic talent, not class, should be
the basis for selecting the Army’s leadership.106 In the late 18th and
early 19th centuries, ofﬁcer appointments were given to the upper
and noble classes, regardless of the appointee’s capabilities.107 The
rising middle class, who had much talent to offer, was regarded
with suspicion. Due to this mistrust and based on class, middle-class
citizens were not considered suitable for positions of leadership. The
traditional Prussian ofﬁcer corps was opposed to opening ofﬁcer
appointments to the middle and lower classes because any such move
would decidedly threatened their privilege and, as a result, the issue
of who or what classes could be selected for leadership positions was
not totally resolved until after 1918.108 Despite the resistance of the
privileged classes, the reformers actively promoted the concept that
ability, not class, should be a major consideration for appointment
and advancement in the Prussian Army.
A signiﬁcant reform in ofﬁcer education occurred in 1810 with
the founding of a new military academy in Berlin. The Academy,
which was initially named the Allgemeine Kriegsschule, provided a
rigorous 3-year education to a small group of ofﬁcers—initially 50,
later reduced to 40—who studied, among other subjects, geography
(as it related to military applications), artillery physics, chemistry,
and both tactics and strategy.109 Though it was a military school, it
was intended to be a military equivalent of Humboldt University,
which opened in Berlin the same year. Thus, the curriculum was
both specialized—providing military science topics—and, at the
same time, included what could be termed academic subjects like
the sciences, literature, and foreign languages. In the Scharnhorst
era, an important part of the revised curriculum was providing a
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new generation of ofﬁcers with a higher level of scientiﬁc training—
in essence a broader education—than military topics alone.
The curriculum for this new school reﬂected the educational
philosophy of Scharnhorst, the school’s head. He sought better
educated, or in reality, more broadly educated ofﬁcers. He was highly
intrigued about how Napoleon’s army, a people’s or a revolutionary
army that was not composed of professional soldiers, could engage
professional armies on the battleﬁeld and win. Since this deﬁed
conventional logic, nonprofessionals defeating professionals, he
believed that to understand how this could happen, one had to
understand the French and go beyond merely studying their tactics
and military methods. Thus, in accordance with Scharnhorst’s
philosophy, the curriculum had more depth than just military and
tactical subjects. Simply put, ofﬁcers needed to be educated, not
narrowly trained in pure or direct military skills.
It is probably no coincidence that a young lieutenant, Carl von
Clausewitz, a promising ofﬁcer who was a part of Scharnhorst’s study
group, would in his writings become an advocate of understanding
war on a broader plane. Clausewitz would later become strongly
associated in the minds of many students of military affairs with this
newly established school for Prussian military ofﬁcers.110
The better students in this academy proved to be an excellent
recruiting ground for General Staff ofﬁcers. One of the better-known
reforms of the Prussian ofﬁcer corps during this period was the
reorganization of the General Staff in 1803. General Staff ofﬁcers
became a highly trained group of military who could effectively
support their commanders.111 The idea of having well-trained
and well-educated ofﬁcers on the staff of larger units and higher
headquarters was important for reforming some of the problems in
the Prussian army. With senior command positions held by ofﬁcers
of class and nobility, well-educated and talented young ofﬁcers could
serve an important function by advising the ill-prepared nobility on
the art of war. As noted by Scharnhorst,
Normally it is not possible for an army to simply dismiss incompetent
generals. The very authority which their ofﬁce bestows upon generals is
the ﬁrst reason for this. Moreover, the generals form a clique, tenaciously
supporting each other, all convinced that they are the best possible
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representatives of the army. But we can at least give them capable
assistants. Thus, the General Staff Ofﬁcers are those who support
incompetent generals, providing the talents that might otherwise be
wanting among leaders and commanders.112

Scharnhorst’s concept of an ofﬁcer, who was both educated in the art
of war and at the same time was given a broader education which
was designed to provide a better understanding of the world and its
problems, was the essence of his educational reforms. The overall
purpose was to teach the ofﬁcer how to think or, as stated at the
time:
Although the training is tailored to teach the student the special knowledge
and skills corresponding to his future assignments, great store is set by
combining the studies with the extended use of thinking in order to make
the training of the mind the main subject of training.113

The system of education devised by Scharnhorst, which proved
to enhance the strength of the recently reformed Prussian General
Staff, assumed that the head of state, in this case the King of Prussia,
would make the necessary political decisions and set the azimuth
for the government. Then a ranking military ofﬁcer would be given
the task in the event of war of assisting the sovereign to achieve
his political goals through the military instrument of power. Since
the ranking military ofﬁcer might hold his position due to nobility,
rather than education or military experience, it would be the welleducated General Staff ofﬁcer(s) who could assist the commander in
achieving his and his sovereign’s goals.
To achieve this level of expertise, the education, or training as
it was called at the Allgemeine Kriegsschule (General War School),
lasted 3 years. As mentioned previously, initially 50, later reduced
to 40, ofﬁcers attended lectures for essentially 9 months per year.
Beginning in 1819, the school was placed under the Inspector General
of Training and Education. Despite Scharnhorst’s death in June 1813,
the educational philosophy he promoted remained even after the
end of the Napoleonic era.114 The curriculum used between 1823-26
clearly shows that the concept of producing well-educated ofﬁcers
endured despite the passage of a decade.
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Allgemeine Kriegsschule Curriculum.
First Year

Second year

Third Year

Analysis of Finites
Topography
General History
Statistics
Artillery
Tactics
Terrain Surveying
Conversational French
Horsemanship

Spherical Progonometry
Essentials of Mechanical Science
Analysis of Inﬁnites
Science of Fortiﬁcations
Natural Science/Physics
Effective Strategic Development
Terrain Surveying
Conversational French
German Literature

History of Selected Campaigns
Fortress Warfare
General Literature
History of the General Staff
Terrain Surveying

Table 1. General War School Curriculum by Year, 1823.115
The curriculum blended military studies, mathematics, science,
literature, and foreign language. The concept of developing a broadly
educated ofﬁcer was imbedded in the academy’s curriculum while
Carl von Clausewitz was director (1818-30) and was the philosophy
while Helmuth von Moltke was a student at the General War School
(1823-26).
Ultimately the General War School was intended to educate two
different types of ofﬁcers. First, it was designed to prepare ofﬁcer
candidates for their exams, and second, it also offered ofﬁcers an
opportunity to have a higher, more advanced education, including an
emphasis on the sciences which Scharnhorst thought was important.
Frederick Willhelm III, King of Prussia from 1797-1840, ultimately
split these functions, establishing three ofﬁcer schools. The ﬁrst was
in Berlin and the other two in Breslau and Königsberg. The General
War School became an institution for educating more senior ofﬁcers.
In fact, as noted by one writer, the ofﬁcers attending the General War
School desired “to prepare themselves for higher and extraordinary
tasks in the service.” 116
Once Germany grasped the guidon of uniﬁcation and the Wars of
Uniﬁcation made a uniﬁed Germany a reality, the curriculum evolved
slowly and subtly. One study, critical of German ofﬁcer education
during the Imperial period, charges that there was a gradual but
consistent trend to focus the curriculum much more directly on
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military matters. Thus, these changes eroded Scharnhorst’s concept
to provide selected German ofﬁcers with a broad educational
experience. As noted by the study’s author:
Prussian ofﬁcer education actually declined in quality during the Imperial
period. Despite the liberal beginnings of Scharnhorst, professional
curricula throughout most of the 19th century, and especially during the
imperial period, were increasingly conﬁned to purely military studies.
Providing a broad view of events, ideas, and people was, if not publicly
scorned, determined by the army to be the business of secondary schools
and universities, not the armed forces.117

An examination of the curriculum, however, calls this assertion
to question. If, for example, the curriculum immediately following
the establishment of the German Empire is examined, it still appears
to follow the Scharnhorst model in that it emphasized a broader
education for German ofﬁcers. Philosophy, literature, history, and
foreign languages were required, and the emphasis on science and
math that Scharnhorst found important was also still present.
Kriegsakademie Curriculum, 1871.
First Year

Second Year

Third Year

Formal Tactics
Military History
Arms and Ordinance
Field Fortiﬁcations
Mathematics
History
Geography
Physical Geography
Conversational French
Conversational Russian

Applied Tactics
Military History (to 1815)
Permanent Fortiﬁcations
Military Surveying
Military Geography
Military Administration
Mathematics
History
Intro. to History of Philosophy
Experimental Physics
Conversational French
Conversational Russian

Military Justice
Military Hygeine
Military History to 1815
Siege Warfare
General Staff Service
Mathematics
Geodesy (only with math option)
History of Literature
History of Philosophy
General History to 1840
Experimental Physics
Conversational French
Conversational Russian

Table 2. War College Curriculum by Year, 1871.118
A review of the 1898 edition of Die Aufnahme-Prüfung für die
Kriegsakademie (The Admissions Test for the War Academy), a book
intended to prepare students for entry into the War College, also
reveals a similar conclusion.119 This preparatory text focuses on
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the tactical level of war, ignoring the strategic level as well as the
societal or economic factors that impacted the strategy of their state.
Consistently in the literature of this German Academy of higher
learning, the strategic level and the societal and political elements
that impact on the affairs of the nation were conspicuously absent.
Even after the turn of the century, the curriculum at the war college
retained most of Scharnhorst’s concepts. The instructional program
had the traditional math and science element that Scharnhorst so
valued and even added a fourth foreign language, Japanese, to the
curriculum. At the same time, philosophy and literature, present for
decades in the instruction program, disappeared.
Kriegsakademie Curriculum, 1903.
First Year

Second Year

Third year

Tactics
Military History
Arms and Ordinance
Field Fortiﬁcations
Military Justice
History
Physics
Physics for Mathematics
Mathematics
Physical Geography
General and
French (or)
Russian (or)
English (or)
Japanese

Tactics
Military History
Fortiﬁcation Theory
Field Intelligence
Plotting
Transportation
Military Hygiene
(or)
History
Mathematics (or)
Chemistry
French (or)
Russian (or)
English (or)
Japanese

Tactics
Military History
Siege Warfare
General Staff Service
Naval Warfare
State Administration, State
and International Law
Mathematics
Surveying
French (or)
Russian (or)
English (or)
Japanese

Table 3. War College Curriculum by Year, 1903.
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What is most intriguing in this curriculum is the apparent
expansion of tactical studies. Granted, most wars for the average
military man relate to tactics, and most ofﬁcers and their soldiers will
have to ﬁght either on the tactical or, at most, on the operational level
of war. If the Prusso-German experience from 1864–71 is considered,
as well as the tactical reforms from 1872-1906, it is perhaps logical
that additional tactical instruction was deemed important for the
new German army’s leadership. During the Wars of Uniﬁcation, the
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Prussian/Moltke approach to war had focused on tactical victories
that facilitated the achievement of strategic goals set by Bismarck
and the crown. Many Germans credited the Prussian General Staff
and the senior ofﬁcer leadership with German victories, ignoring
the role that reasonable goals and logical strategies played in this
achievement. Thus, the laurels were given to the tactical commanders
in the ﬁeld and their overall commander, Helmuth von Moltke. As
noted by one writer, “The Prusso-German army was an institution at
once simple and complex, with a strategic culture largely shaped by
the three short Wars of Uniﬁcation against Denmark, Austria, and
France.”121 This focus has caused the distinguished German historian,
Holger Herwig, to conclude:
Tactics reigned supreme in Prussia. The system concentrated on the nuts
and bolts of the military profession. Its members were drilled in the theory
and practice of the latest weapons, their implications for operations, and
their advantages and limitations.122

The experience of the Wars of Uniﬁcation, which emphasized
the role of tactical victories—the defeat of enemy forces and the
destruction of their armies—promoted a tactical culture and the
pursuit and achievement of tactical victories in the ﬁeld. In many
respects, the pursuit of tactical victories became a strategy in itself.
The senior German ofﬁcer corps ignored Clausewitz, the key German
strategist who is studied today at American military institutions.
Clausewitz was considered more of a philosopher, a theoretician of
war rather than a practitioner. General Wilhelm Groener, who was
Chief of the War Ofﬁce from 1916-17, indicated that in his reading
he was “more occupied with books of the practical service, than with
books on high strategy.”123 Of equal signiﬁcance, Moltke the younger
advised his son, who was preparing to enter the War Academy, to
read Schlieffen’s essays on Cannae, rather than Clausewitz. This
was likely good advice, considering the tactical focus of the War
Academy’s curriculum.124 Hans Delbrück, a later strategist whose life
parallels the second German Empire and who was a keen critic of the
lack of logical strategy by the ofﬁcer corps, was ignored, criticized,
and ostracized.125 Thus, even as a later generation of German ofﬁcers
readily admitted that they had failed to read the turgid prose of
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Mein Kampf, the Imperial ofﬁcer corps of the late 19th and early 20th
centuries ignored Clausewitz, who they deemed more a political
philosopher. Instead, they studied more practical authors.
As the curriculum in the senior educational institution of the
Prussian/German army is considered and criticized for its tactical
focus, the question should be asked whether the curriculum at the
U.S. Army’s senior level institution was any better focused on the
strategic level than that of the German institution. In certain respects,
an exact comparison is somewhat difﬁcult because the United States
did not even have a senior institution until after the turn of the
century. Such an institution was created through the educational
reforms proposed by Secretary of War Elihu Root and put into place
by War Department General Order #155. At the cornerstone laying
of the War College in early 1903, however, Root in his comments
was clear about what he considered the focus of the institution. He
called for, among other things, the study of the “great problems of
National Defense.”126 Furthermore, comparison is difﬁcult because,
at ﬁrst, the Army War College avoided an emphasis on lectures
and classes and instead had study groups which worked with the
Army Staff on important issues for national defense. Although the
curriculum content varied, depending on who was the president,
enough references to strategic issues, to regional studies, and other
higher level studies exist to state that the curriculum of this new
institution was not one exclusively focused on the tactical level.127
The tactical orientation of the German military education system
did not cause any noticeable problems immediately following the
Wars of Uniﬁcation. In the latter part of Moltke’s and Bismarck’s
tenure, however, senior German ofﬁcers, largely members of
the General Staff, pressed to become more involved in matters
of strategy, if not strategy-making itself. This resulted from the
ofﬁcer corps’ unease over their perception that Bismarck failed to
understand the dangers posed by an increasingly powerful Russia.
This and the defense quandary that faced Germany in the 1880s,
i.e, the possibility of Germany having to ﬁght a war on two fronts,
caused many General Staff ofﬁcers, active and retired, to push for
direct involvement in the development of German strategy.
Their desire to participate more directly in strategy development,
if not lead in it, calls to question another problem for the German
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military as well as the political leadership—a lack of experience as a
world power. Consider that in the time frame from 1864–71, Prussia
progressed from its role of one of the two leaders of the German
states to that of the most powerful state dominating a uniﬁed
Germany. It transitioned from being a strong player in the politics
and military affairs of Western and Central Europe to being the most
signiﬁcant and powerful nation in those regions. In the latter part of
the 19th century, it transitioned from being a continental power with
a miniscule navy, to that of a major naval power competing with
the British Navy on the high seas. The second wave of the industrial
revolution, which hit Europe in the last third of the 19th century,
would also propel Germany into the role of the economic giant in
these regions. In short, in a period of less than 25 years, Germany
came into being as a uniﬁed state and Prussia moved from being one
of the German states to being the primary inﬂuence as the dominant
player in European politics. As noted by one historian:
Every nation-state is continually developing. Sometimes there are periods
of rapid change when this development seems to get out of hand. During
the late 19th century, Germany entered such a period. It was a time of
essential schizophrenia: the state appeared at the same time monarchical
and constitutional in its politics, agrarian and industrial in its economy
and feudal and egalitarian in its society.128

The rapid change in the nation’s status in Europe and the immense
political, military, and economic power available to Germany came
so quickly that the political and military leadership, with a few
exceptions, did not have the time or the experiences to transition
from being a European state to being the leading European power.
In short, there was an immaturity in the nation’s political and
military leadership that would not have been present if the nation’s
development had proceeded at a slower or more measured pace.
Despite the lack of experience in being military leaders of a major
power, key senior ofﬁcers in Berlin, active and retired, with tactical
and, at most, campaign level experience, chafed under the plans and
restrictions of Bismarck’s heavy hand. They sought to have a larger
role in Germany’s strategy development. Moltke, with his stature
as a military hero and a military educator in his own right, perhaps
could have inﬂuenced this emerging German military culture (and
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its educational structure) because, despite his disagreements with
the political leadership in 1866 and 1871, he understood strategic
thinking. Conversely, though he recognized the importance of
strategy, he seemed to be more comfortable in the tactical world
and found tactics more important than strategy for the vast majority
of the ofﬁcer corps.129 He was, after all, the epitome of the General
Staff ofﬁcer whose role was to consider the enemy that the German
Empire might have to ﬁght, and to develop and reﬁne the war plans
that would bring about German victory. He likely developed this
understanding based on voluminous self-imposed studies of both
history and military affairs, which he consistently undertook during
his entire career. Even though this patron saint of German military
thought acknowledged the role of war and how it could be used to
achieve the policy goals of the government (sounding very much
like Clausewitz), in practice he seemed much more comfortable with
tactics and what is now called operational warfare. Besides, he found
strategy to be logical and intuitive. In his own words, “strategy is the
application of common sense to the conduct of war.”130
Neither through education nor through the experiential base of
its military and political leadership, was the young German nation
prepared for its new role in the world. It came all too fast. Once
the 19th century drew to an end and the 20th century emerged, the
military leadership of Germany was increasingly unable to handle
the challenges facing it. The inﬂuential military leadership viewed
the world’s political and military landscape almost solely from a
military view, and neither experience nor education promoted an
appreciation of national policy, strategy, or strategy formulation.
Had the political leadership of the nation been more astute or more
experienced, the military shortcomings might have been solvable.
But it was not. The political leadership could not seem to develop
a long-term set of goals and a security policy that would promote
the long-range national interests of the nation. Even if it had, the
mercurial and immature Kaiser, whose inﬂuence on both realms was
not at all constructive, remained. None of these factors boded well
for the newly emerging nation-state of the late 19th century or for the
community of nations.
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CHAPTER 5
CHARTING THE COURSE FOR DISASTER
It has never been my “business to comment upon Grand strategy . . .
there never took place during my entire period in ofﬁce a sort of war
council at which politics were brought into the military for and against.
Theobald von Bettmann Hollweg, Chancellor131

What seems certain, national security strategy and strategy
development ﬂoundered in the post-Bismarck era. With a new
and impetuous Emperor, a weak Chancellor, and an increasingly
rudderless ship of state, the most organized entity in Germany
appeared to be the military. On the surface, the military establishment
appeared to be stable, organized, and, in all, a dependable bulwark
for the Emperor and Germany’s social structure. In reality the
military was not nearly as organized as it seemed. The Imperial
military establishment, much like the government it served, was a
Byzantine operation with intrigues, deals being cut, and careers made
and terminated in an atmosphere that was often only constrained by
the inherent limits of the individual’s capabilities. Thus, the military
dabbled in the business of foreign relations and alliances, often in
isolation from civilian authority, and in the Chancellor’s realm, which
prior to 1889 had dominated both domestic and foreign affairs.
It is also relevant that, as the 19th century came to a close, there
was not simply one German military establishment. By the 1890s,
actually two very independent military establishments existed. As
noted previously, the late 19th century had seen the rapid expansion
of the German Navy. It had been a small and rather insigniﬁcant
force in the heyday of German military victories, i.e., the Wars of
Uniﬁcation. A greater role for the Navy in the military structure
of all major powers, to include Germany, had been signiﬁcantly
boosted by the writings of Alfred Mahan. The impact of Mahan’s
writings, the interest of Kaiser William in this visible evidence of
Germany’s growing power, and the political inﬂuence of Admiral
Alfred von Tirpitz meant that the German Navy was destined
to become a signiﬁcant part of the force structure. When Admiral
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Tirpitz formulated his plans for the high seas ﬂeet to defend against
an enemy that his plans helped create (Great Britain), he and his
naval colleagues worked in isolation from the Army and the civilian
government on budgets, manpower projections, strategy, and war
plans. The Navy, dominated by a group of aggressive ofﬁcers,
planned for a qualitative force that could wage a cataclysmic battle
between Germany and Britain on the south central regions of the
North Sea. Their planning was exclusively navy planning, which
was never shared or coordinated with their Army peers.
The Army, too, continued its planning for a future war in isolation
from their colleagues in blue. Its planning for the next war, initially
accomplished by the elder Moltke, tended to follow his philosophy
of war. Thus, the next war would be a short but violent war, a war of
rapid maneuver, with Germany concentrating its forces and quickly
and decisively defeating the French Army with a ﬂank attack. With
the French army destroyed, the German Army could then turn on the
Russians and defeat this secondary threat.132 The concept of massive
single-wing envelopment, normally referred to as the Schlieffen
Plan, is normally attributed to the Army’s Chief of the General Staff
(1891-1905), Alfred von Schlieffen. In actuality, the overall concept
of this ﬂank attack and envelopment owes more to Moltke than to
Schlieffen.133 Moltke promoted this type of indirect attack, particularly
after witnessing the ﬁrepower which was employed in the FrancoPrussian War. He came to doubt whether victories like Königgrätz
and Sedan were achievable any longer,
given the emerging modern ﬁrepower
on the battleﬁeld. Still, there seemed little
choice, and he continued to plan for and
brood about a two-front war.
After Moltke’s retirement, Schlieffen
studied and wrote about Germany’s
precarious situation and added his wisdom
on how Germany’s dread fear, a war on
two fronts, could best be handled. His
Cannae essays, published in the Quarterly
For Tactics and Military Science (1909-13),
showed a consistent interest in the concept
Alfred Graf von Schlieffen
of envelopment, and his 1909 essay, “War
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in the Present Day,” clearly demonstrated more of a studious nature
than someone pursuing a singular method of waging the next war.
Schlieffen actually considered a number of eventualities to defend
Germany from its unique strategic dilemma and indicated a decided
preference for defensive offensive operations.134 His successors,
however, clearly focused on the concept of single wing envelopment,
ignoring the elder Moltke’s reservations about the increasing
advantages of defensive operations.
It is curious yet predictable, considering the Byzantine nature
of German civilian and military politics, that as the Navy prepared
for its North Sea battle and the Army attempted to defend against
enemies on two fronts, no serious move took place to develop any
type of a joint planning. Ironically, they even failed to agree on
the issue of what constituted the major threat to Germany. For the
Army, the major threat was from France and Russia, which had
encircled Germany through their alliance. According to the Navy,
the major threat to Germany was clearly Great Britain. Even when
Britain succeeded in resolving its colonial issues in France, resulting
in the entente’ cordiale and the extension of this entente’ to Russia in
1907, the two services still maintained their different perspective on
the threat—and planned according to their perceptions. Despite the
worsening situation for the German Empire, no serious attempt was
made to create a board or a commission to provide the new nation
with either a joint or at least a national approach to either military or
strategic planning.135
In this respect, Germany was unique among the major western
powers it would ultimately face in World War I. Great Britain had
its Committee of Imperial Defence which coordinated defense
planning. France had established its Conseil superieure de guerre
as its coordinative body. Even the United States, only gradually
acknowledging its major power status, recognized the signiﬁcance
of some type of coordination in planning among the services. Thus,
in the wake of the Spanish American War, as a part of Elihu Root’s
reforms in 1903, a Joint Army and Navy Board was established.
This board consisted of four ofﬁcers from each branch and was
chaired by Admiral Thomas Dewey. Their task was to develop the
overall general principles for the defense of the United States and
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its possessions, and to undertake the development of war plans in
the event of a possible war with designated nations. While, as noted
by Russell Weigley, “none of this strategic planning turned out to
have much relevance to the war the country found itself in 1917,” it
was nonetheless a coordinated planning effort by two services, even
though each had their own priorities.136
To complicate Germany’s situation even further, at the start of
the 20th century, the army’s role in the new uniﬁed Germany was
splint into two signiﬁcant parts. Granted, an obvious role was to
defend the nation, but from whom was still a question. The Prussian
Army of the 18th century always had a domestic role of defending
the state from its own people, i.e., the middle and lower class masses.
The fear of the masses by the ruling class did not disappear in the
post-Napoleonic era but continued throughout the 19th century. In
fact, it was still an issue on the eve of World War I. After all, from
the perspective of the ruling elites, the 19th century had seen two
revolutions from the lower and middle classes, one in 1830 and the
most serious in 1848. After uniﬁcation had been accomplished, the
consistent growth of liberalism and socialism in German political
life threatened the social fabric and political structure of Imperial
Germany. These events were clear evidence to the leadership that a
bulwark was needed to maintain the country’s social order. Between
1905 and 1913 there were several reminders of the importance—even
primacy—of the Army’s role in maintaining domestic tranquility. As
Admiral von Tirpitz was planning his high seas ﬂeet, which Germany
could ill afford, and General Alfred von Schlieffen was writing
analyzing Cannae and double wing envelopments, Kaiser Wilhelm
informed then Chancellor (1905) Bernhard von Bülow that Germany
could not afford to ﬁght a war. Tying down the German Army in
a war against a foreign adversary could endanger “the safety and
property of its [Germany’s] citizens in the face of the mounting ‘red
menace’ (that is, the growing socialist party).”137 As late as 1913, the
new Chief of the German General Staff Helmuth von Moltke (the
younger) was trying to obtain authorization for the additional troops
needed to successfully stage the single wing envelopment known
as the Schlieffen Plan. He was warned repeatedly by the German
War Minister, Josias von Heeringen, of the Army’s important role
in quelling domestic disturbances and the dangers of opening the
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army to democratization (by including more and more working class
citizens).138 Thus the question emerged, What was the prime role
for the Army—defense against internal disorder or defense against
external enemies? Did Germany have the resources to defend against
both?
As a ﬁnal insult to common sense, coordination in defense
planning and strategy between the civilian and military authorities
was nonexistent. The civilian authorities had in many respects set
the stage for this problem by their inability to get their own house
in order. From the time Waldersee became Chancellor in 1890, the
Chancellor’s role in working with the Emperor to develop goals
and objectives and strategies to achieve these goals continually had
diminished. The ﬁrst failure in the German political realm was the
inability of the Kaiser and his Chancellors to develop something akin
to the rather symbiotic relationship that existed between William I and
Bismarck.139 The immediate post-Bismarck Chancellors were unsure
of what they wanted, except that their goals and strategies would
not follow Bismarck’s. Thus, they bumbled and bungled, attempting
to chart their own course, but without taking a compass along on
their diplomatic journeys. By the time of Theobald von BethmannHollweg’s Chancellorship (1909-17), the Chancellor was largely
absent from a signiﬁcant role in developing national strategy, even
though his postwar claim of his lack of involvement in this realm is a
distortion.140 In the end, his major contribution to Germany’s defense
for the coming war was to convince the Socialists to support the war
effort.
For Germany, the disconnect between civilian and military
authorities was a major problem because the strategies developed
by the General Staff were not strategies at all. Based on ofﬁcer
education and the army’s culture, they were instead tactical and
operational concepts. In all, the Army lived in the shadow of the
Wars of Uniﬁcation, perhaps never truly recognizing that tactics
and operational concepts were no substitute for strategy. The
Emperor also was little help because, even though he clearly wanted
to ﬁnd Germany’s place in the sun and to gain the respect among
the community of major powers, he failed to recognize that this
cannot be done by treading on the diplomatic toes of the other major
nations. He ignored Bismarck’s concept of being the hegemon of
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Europe, without appearing to be, without ﬂaunting the economic
and military power of the German Empire.
Conversely, neither William II nor his Chancellors were the evil
men portrayed by wartime propaganda. The Kaiser was instead an
unbelievably immature individual who could not set reasonable and
achievable goals for his nation. Due to the quirks in his personality,
neither could he acquiesce to the goals nor strategies set by a strong
chancellor, as had his grandfather, even if such an individual had
been available. As a consequence, Germany wallowed diplomatically
through the last decade of the 19th century and the ﬁrst of the 20th
with the Chancellors, Foreign Ministers, and the Kaiser irritating the
other major powers through their ineptitude and through William’s
bombast. By 1907, if not earlier, Germany had achieved one major
accomplishment on the world scene as it related to security policy; it
had managed to encircle itself with unfriendly alliances composed of
the other European powers. In Bismarck’s heyday, Berlin had made
rapid progress toward becoming the center of European diplomacy.
Under William II, it had become an island surrounded by unfriendly
waters.
In this atmosphere, the planners of the services became even more
signiﬁcant. Moltke had planned on how to ﬁght a war on two fronts,
and Schlieffen’s writings had contributed to additional thought on
how to deal with such a quandary. Men, more men, and more corps
were needed to ﬁght the war that military planners knew would
come. The goal of this war was to break out of the encirclement
that was threatening Germany. On December 8, 1912, William II
convened a war council. When the council met, War Minister Josia
von Heeringen was not even present. After all, though an ofﬁcer, he
was a part of the civilian government. While subordination of the
military to civilian authority had been a problem since Bismarck’s
day, at this juncture it was clear that the General Staff had won.141
The Kaiser’s assessment was that war was inevitable, an
assessment agreed to by Moltke the younger. In the wake of this
council, pressure was exerted on the civilian side of the government
to increase appropriations for the military and to increase the number
of German soldiers in uniform. In the days following this meeting, the
War Minister and the Chancellor were briefed on the basic concepts
of the General Staff’s version of the Schlieffen Plan. The war, when
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it came, would be a war to relieve the peace-loving German nation
from the encirclement that threatened its very existence. Was there a
grand strategy that governed all of this? No, initially there were only
operational and tactical plans designed to relieve the encirclement of
Germany. This, in short, had become the German way of war.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
It is simply not true that Schlieffen was keen on wresting control from the
politicians. . . . His continued inﬂuence on German policy was the fault of
Bismarck’s sucessors, who carelessly squandered his legacy.
Brigadier General Dr. Günter Roth142

Even before the Guns of August opened up in 1914, initiating
the over 4 years of carnage we know as World War I, the failures of
the German way of war were already evident. They did not begin
with the nightmare National Socialist years when a political leader
with the background of a corporal in a Bavarian Regiment moved
corps and armies, they began in the mid-19th century as Germany
was being formed into a nation-state and they saw their ultimate
expression during World War I.143 The problems and the resulting
failures are summarized below.
The ﬁrst problem relates to the German General Staff, the elite
military staff group that was reformed during the Scharnhorst era.
It was redesigned in the early 19th century to provide well-trained
and professional advice to senior ofﬁcers. The senior leaders of that
period generally had their appointments due to social and/or political
position rather than military training and thus needed the advice of
experts to carry out their duties competently. The capabilities of the
General Staff ofﬁcers and their professionalism were clearly evident
in the Wars of Uniﬁcation, but they came to regard themselves as
experts, Bismarck said demagogues, both in war and in matters
of state, i.e., as these matters related to Germany’s security policy.
The latter, matters of state, were far and above their training and
experience. Their experience was in the Moltke era, in a time when
Moltke had taken concepts of Napoleonic warfare—rapid maneuver
and concentration of forces on the ﬁeld to destroy the enemy army—
and had signiﬁcantly improved them using the technology of the
Industrial age. Through Moltke’s writings and his campaigns, the
General Staff came to believe that in these “modern” campaigns,
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characterized by rapid and decisive military actions, a strategy could
be found for the German nation.144
Beginning in the 1860s, the General Staff, and the senior ofﬁcer
corps in general, chaffed against and intrigued against civilian
control of the nation in war and peace. They were a dangerous
group for a new parliamentary democracy as they were outside the
constitutional government and ignored, as well as actively subverted,
the constitutional lawful part of the government. They built their
fame and their reputation on the Wars of Uniﬁcation, more than in the
reformist Scharnhorst era. Through their mid-19th century victories
and by the last decade of that century, they had become dominant
players in German security strategy/military strategy. Their push to
short circuit their fellow ofﬁcers in the “civilian” branch of the war
ministry and their desire to override the Chancellor in matters of
strategy were, by this time, completely successful.
The success of the General Staff in attaining a dominant role in
determining Germany’s security policy was dangerous for Germany
and for Europe. By education and experience, they had little exposure
to the higher levels of strategy and perhaps never truly realized that
their famed victories in the Wars of Uniﬁcation were due to the wise,
though arbitrary, policies and strategies established by Otto von
Bismarck rather than the military in general, and the General Staff
in particular. Again, their mentor was Moltke the Elder, a master of
military art in the ﬁeld, and not Clausewitz who is remembered for
his writings on strategy.145 Thus, their perspective was that of tactical
ﬁeld ofﬁcers, though admittedly they also functioned on what we
today call the operational level of war. Thus, they came to confuse
tactical and operational success as synonymous with strategy. In
fact, successful tactics with victory on the ﬁeld was, for many senior
German ofﬁcers, a strategy in itself.
The reforms of the early 19th century gave them a signiﬁcant
place in the Prussian/German system, but those same reforms failed
to give them the necessary education to see above and beyond the
area of tactical operations. Had appropriate counterbalances existed
in the civilian realm to negate their rise to prominence, perhaps the
Germany of the 20th century might have been somewhat different—
but there were none. After Bismarck, Germany failed to produce,
or better yet, elevate to a position of authority, a statesman of the
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former’s stature or talents. One cannot agree with the assertion by the
Chief of the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt that, after Bismarck,
the senior military ofﬁcer corps moved to ﬁll a vacuum created
by defaulters, bankrupt politicians.146 In reality, the General Staff
had pressed for an increasing role in strategy and security policy
from 1871 until the end of that century. In reality, Gerhard Ritter’s
comments likely sum up the situation best:
The historic guilt of Bismarck’s successors lies in the fact that they allowed
themselves to be drawn into this dependency, [a dependency on military
technocrats] that without raising a voice of opposition they accepted war
planning as being the privilege of the military expert.147

The failure, however, was both military and political. The
politicians acquiesced, were taken in, or were overwhelmed by the
military experts. In the end, the General Staff’s army plans and that
of Tirpitz and his naval staff for only military options sufﬁced for
some sort of strategy for the German nation. Their solutions were
not really a strategy for Germany; in reality, they were militarydominated tactical and operational plans devoid of strategies.
Where were the political solutions for Germany between 1890
and 1914? Could the political element of power have been exercised,
rather than the military? At one time, political solutions clearly
existed to resolve Germany’s problems, but they were squandered
by inept politicians who had seriously damaged Germany’s political
reputation by their ineptitude and unrealistic schemes and strategies.
Even if the political leadership had designed achievable strategies
for the post- Bismarck Second Reich, or had promoted the political
or economic element of power, there was the Kaiser. As the 19th
century came to an end, there could not have been a more unfortunate
successor to the German throne. Even another Bismarck might not
have been able to counterbalance this mercurial personality. While
the post-1945 German generals consistently complained about
Hitler’s interference in Germany’s military plans and operations,
one only has to give a cursory review of the post-Bismarck era to
see that Hitler assuredly was not the ﬁrst German head of state to
meddle in politics and military affairs.
Returning to the original question raised in the introduction, are
there lessons to be learned from studying the German way of war,
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or have we, in fact, studied them far too much? At the same time,
have key lessons been missed? In reality, military students have
missed or glossed over a very important lesson: the importance of
the national leadership setting achievable goals and the importance
of adopting strategies to achieve them. Instead, both civilian and
military students of modern Germany have pursued a fascination
with the tactical and operational victories won by the Germans,
particularly in World War II. Granted, whether one studies the 1870
Sedan operations or the almost staggering victory brought about by
the Wehrmacht through the 1941 Kiev encirclement, tactically and
operationally the German Army was an amazing force in the ﬁeld.
What we have ignored, a signiﬁcant lesson provided by the
Germans, is that sometimes victories in the ﬁeld are not enough. The
Germans, too, ignored this lesson. Instead, they studied, particularly
in the late 19th century, tactical and operational warfare, for the
patron saint of Germany’s military leadership was Helmuth von
Moltke, not Clausewitz. From the mid-19th century, the German
army—Moltke’s Army—developed a fascination with ﬂank attacks
and envelopments which culminated in the immediate pre-World
War I Cannae essays. As Schlieffen studied classical warfare and
wrote about the Punic wars, both he and his military disciples missed
a signiﬁcant lesson. Hannibal, the mastermind of Carthaginian
victories, was only a success tactically. Despite his domination of
the Roman countryside, from the start of the Second Punic War (218
B.C.) until virtually the end, 14 years later, he lost the Second Punic
War. Even though he had amassed an almost unbelievable string
of tactical victories throughout the length of the Italian Peninsula,
including the classical double-wing envelopment at Cannae, in the
end the famous Carthaginian failed. In the Battle of Zama, he not only
lost this solitary battle, he lost the war together with the Carthaginian
Empire. Roman strategies, and ultimately tactics, prevailed. The
lesson of the Second Punic War and of 20th century Germany is that
without sound strategies, both national and military, without logical
achievable goals, tactical and operational victories—even small war
victories—may in the end mean very little to a nation. For Hitler’s
Germany, Poland, France, the Low countries, and Norway were all
spectacular victories—victories still studied today, but what was the
result for the German nation? The most signiﬁcant lesson provided
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by a study of the German way of war is the importance of having an
achievable set of goals for a nation and strategies to achieve those
goals. This lesson is far more signiﬁcant than the factors that resulted
in their tactical and operational successes.
Second, once a nation sets its goals, to have the best chance of
achieving them, that nation should always attempt to use multiple
elements of power. If a nation’s military is allowed to plan in
isolation, if the political leadership acquiesces and defers to the
military in developing security policy, in all likelihood, the solutions
to the problems will be military and the element of power utilized
will be military. That Germany, after uniﬁcation and after Bismarck,
failed to develop a competent and respected diplomatic corps and
that this nation failed to recognize how to use the economic power
resulting from its rapid late 19th century industrialization, is a sad
commentary on its leadership.
Third, a nation must have its military establishment function as a
uniﬁed force. If, as was the case with the German Navy, its plans are
based on one set of contingencies with the army’s on another and both
compete for the same resources with no coordination, the country’s
military will be unable to fully develop or effectively employ the full
strength of its forces. Since the passage of Goldwater-Nichols, today’s
U.S. military forces have been pushed, sometimes dragged into a joint
culture. At times, this process has been painful for the leadership of
all of the services, but if there is ever a lesson to be learned from
studying the German military experience, it is the consequence of
failing to have joint planning and utilization of joint military forces
in war. A student of history can only wonder if Germany’s army and
navy had tried to stage any signiﬁcant joint operations in World War
I, whether this could have improved Germany’s military position in
the war. Instead, other than a Baltic joint operation in 1917, it was
as if the German Army and Navy were in the service of different
nations.148 Neither coordination nor cooperation was the order of the
day.
Above all, and something that nations entering the 21st century
should remember, is that the German experience shows the student
of military history/affairs that sometimes technical operational
victories in the ﬁeld are not enough. They need to be a part of a
strategy in pursuit of achievable goals, if the nation is to succeed.
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31. Ibid.
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Oxford University Press, 1978, p. 1.
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New York: George Allen & Unwinn, 1919, pp. 39-46.
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Craig quotes a former member of Bismarck’s opposition, Gustav Mevissen, who,
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of Mars; the goddess of beauty and the mother of the graces appeal more
to my understanding than the powerful god of war, but the trophies of
war exercise a magic spell even upon the child of peace. Involuntarily the
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sustaining them; the enormous cost of being under arms; the disruption
of commerce, manufacture and agriculture; the battle-ready organization
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in an interview in 1890, Moltke reputedly listed Homer’s works, the Bible, and On
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Reden, p. 361.
49. Hughes, Moltke, On the Art of War, pp. 128-129.
50. Ibid., p. 36.
51. As noted by Arden Bucholz in his work, Moltke and the German Wars, 18641871, New York: Palgrave Publications, 2001, pp. 135-138, William I initially had
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serious their disagreements about the leadership of the German states. Once the
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and imposing a punitive peace. Bismarck, worried about Louis Napoleon’s plans
and intentions and concerned about weakening the Hapsburgs and the ensuing
power vacuum, was the voice of moderation.
52. Hughes, Moltke, On the Art of War, p. 25.
53. After the Franco-Prussian war, however, he recognized the signiﬁcance of
politics prior to the war, but he held fast to the view that once the war had begun,
political leaders and their policies should be removed from issues of military
strategy and policy. As noted by Holger Herwig,
. . . the Elder Moltke remained open to change. He understood the
geopolitical chessboard of the 1890s and appreciated that the location of
the Reich between France and Russia deﬁed simple operational tactical
resolution. “It must be left to diplomacy,” Moltke concluded, “to see
if it can achieve a peace settlement” in a future war among the great
powers.
Holger H. Herwig, “The Prussian Model and Military Planning Today,” Joint
Forces Quarterly, Spring 1998, p. 70.
54. The encircled French Army was to become prisoners of war, and all of
their weapons and equipment would fall into German hands. All French ofﬁcers
would be allowed to retain their ﬁrearms, but they, too, would be prisoners of war.
Bucholz, Moltke and the German Wars, 1864-1871, pp. 181-182.
55. As noted by one author, a part of Bismarck’s concern was the possibility of
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Politics of the Prussian Army, p. 206.
56. As succinctly summarized by Otto Pﬂanze, “The conﬂict between Moltke
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troops for further military operations.” Perhaps most signiﬁcant, he noted, “The
Junker had won his private struggle with the military at a crucial time in German
history. But the institutional dualism of military and political authority which was
its cause remained unaltered. One day, long after his death, the problem would
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58. Horst, Moltke: Leben und Werke, p. 363.
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concept on the battleﬁeld. The idea of rapid movement, concentration of force, and
annihilation of the enemy army is warfare in the Napoleonic tradition. Moltke’s
contribution was using the new technology of the period: railroads, telegraph,
and breech loading riﬂes, to give the Prussian Army the speed and ﬁrepower to
accomplish the task. See Dennis Showalter, Railroads and Riﬂes: Soldiers, Technology,
and the Uniﬁcation of Germany, Hampden CT: Archon Books, 1975.
60. Hughes, Moltke on the Art of War, p. 52. Moltke stated, “I am convinced that
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62. Ibid., p. 59.
63. Holger H. Herwig, “Strategic Uncertainties of a Nation-state: PrussiaGermany, 1871-1918,” in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin
Bernstein, eds., The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 251.
64. The Ems dispatch episode is classic Bismarck. When Bismarck received
the original “Ems” telegram, he was initially discouraged by its contents for he
feared that the French message would not serve as the catalyst for the coming
conﬂict. Thus, he edited the telegram to make it inﬂammatory and released it to
the press. For Bismarck, war with France was necessary to complete the process of
uniﬁcation. See William L. Langer, “Bismarck as a Dramatist,” in A. O. Sarkissian,
Studies in Diplomatic History and Historiography in Honor of G. P. Gooch, London:
Longman, 1961, pp. 199-216.
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By the beginning of the 20th century, Germany not only had the most powerful
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world’s dye production. As noted by Otto Pﬂanze, between 1850 and 1860, coal
production in Germany doubled, and the number of steam engines in use rose from
1,416 in 1846 to 10,113 in 1861. Pﬂanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany,
p. 114. In short, in the latter part of the Bismarck years, Germany had immense
political and economic, as well as military power. For the sake of the German
people, it is rather a pity that William II and his ministers did not appreciate that
there were elements of power to be exercised above and beyond the military
element.
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Oxford University Press, 1970, pp. 266-270.
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of German Foreign Policy, 1870-1914, London: Oxford University Press, 1927, pp. 285
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of France. He could see no real value in a war—even a victorious war—for the
German Empire.
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Origins of World War I, New York: Lippincott Publishing Company, 1971, 2nd ed.,
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unprecedented measure of stability. In the 1880s, it faded into a second
stage where Germany’s preeminence was less certain and where overseas
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77. Thus, in 1874 he stated, “I am convinced that improvements in ﬁrearms
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military ofﬁcials. In an era when parliamentary demands were rising, together
with criticism of military budgets, having any part of the military responsible to a
civilian ministry was a major problem for Prussian conservatives.
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with the liberal-leaning Crown Prince and his decidedly liberally-leaning wife.
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Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, eds., Cambridge:
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of Field Marshal at the time of his retirement. Nonetheless, he never trained as a
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84. He stated, Meine Herren, es kann ein siebenjahriger, es kann ein dreissigjahriger
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85. Hermann Hoffman, Fürst Bismarck, 1890-1898; nach personlichen Mitteilungen
des Fürsten and eigenen Aufzeichnungen des Verfassers, nebst einer authentischen Ausgabe
aller vom Fürsten Bismarck, Berlin: Stuttgart Union deutsche verlagsgesellschaft,
1913, Vol I, p. 196.
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it was with the understanding that he would agree that the Chief of the General
Staff would have direct access to the Emperor.
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